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Strict Acceleration In New York
Mortgage Foreclosure - Has The
Doctrine Eroded?t
Bruce J. Bergmantt
I. Introduction
Without question, the most potent weapon in the arsenal of
a mortgagee is the option to declare immediately due and paya-
ble the entire balance of principal and interest upon some
breach of the mortgage agreement.' The leverage obtained, and
t This article is adapted from BERGMAN ON NEW YORK MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES,
and used with permission of the publisher, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. Portions of this
material appeared previously in MORTGAGES AND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN NEW YORK,
published by Callaghan & Co., and is used with permission of the publisher.
tt Partner, Roach & Bergman, Garden City, New York, Adjunct Associate Professor
of Real Estate, New York University Real Estate Institute and Member, American Col-
lege of Real Estate Lawyers.
1. Although this statement is not open to serious debate, there is an alternative
available to be employed under unusual circumstances. For example, where the mortgage
contains a prepayment penalty, accelerating the full balance waives the right to insist
upon the prepayment penalty. George H. Nutman, Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,
115 Misc. 2d 168, 453 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982); Kilpatrick v. Germa-
nia Life Ins. Co., 183 N.Y. 163, 75 N.E. 1124 (1905). The practical, but little known and
infrequently used option, is to foreclose only for the payments in arrears with the prop-
erty to be sold subject to the continuing lien of the mortgage.
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concurrently the power to enforce the mortgage and protect the
investment, is obvious. Consequently, the ability of the mortga-
gee to exercise that option is of paramount importance. When,
and under what circumstances, acceleration is available may be,
or may be perceived as becoming, elusive.
The suggestion here is that while the various bases upon
which a lender may accelerate and foreclose are internally unset-
tled - and may forever be so - there is nonetheless a lucidity
in the confusion. In sum, it has long been accepted that the
courts take a strict stance when there is a failure to pay princi-
pal or interest due on a mortgage. Notwithstanding some recent
pronouncements suggesting a shift in the traditional view, the
unwavering approach has not been effectively or persuasively
challenged.2 While defaults of some other types are open to a
more liberal and sympathetic response from the judiciary, the
other breaches should not be confused with neglect to pay prin-
cipal and interest. In fact, misapprehension of the disparate de-
faults has led to a false and possibly self-fulfilling prophecy as to
where the law in this realm is headed.
As a further brief preliminary, the basis upon which mort-
gages are accelerated - and thus enforced in modern
times - goes back to Graf v. Hope Building Corp.,3 a 1930
court of appeals decision. That ruling set the standard for the
strict approach to foreclosure and provided considerable cer-
tainty whenever the most common mortgage breach is encoun-
tered, that being failure to pay.
But, a serious, not well-recognized, insidious problem has
arisen. The Graf doctrine has come under attack. Had the court
of appeals reversed itself, everyone would understand the appli-
cable law. That is not what has happened. In addition to some
peripheral cases suggesting the waning of Graf, there are seven
cases directly attacking the doctrine. A few are correct in their
result, but wholly in error in purporting to assail Graf. The
others are entirely wrong in both result and as precedent on the
subject of the erosion of Graf.
As these decisions develop periodically, they cite the prior
holdings, and a subtle, steady, and false assault on the stability
2. See infra notes 246-285 and accompanying text.
3. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
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of mortgage foreclosure precedents is quietly emerging, becom-
ing perhaps, as suggested, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Exploring
and clarifying this development is the purpose of this Article.
To expand upon this still further, what these offending
cases have done is fail in analysis - in one of two ways. One
error is to confuse the thrust of Graf. What these cases and the
literature fail to recognize, or at least properly emphasize, is that
Graf's application is primarily for defaults in paying principal
and interest. Thus, to rule against acceleration for failure to pay
taxes, for example, and suggest concurrently that the Graf doc-
trine is weakening, is misplaced.
Another shortcoming, although perhaps understandable, is
that not every court can possess extensive expertise in mortgage
foreclosure law. So, when waiver, for example, is the proper basis
to reject acceleration, some courts, unfamiliar with all the nu-
ances, convert a decision which is otherwise correct into an as-
sault on Graf and thereupon the very critical stability in this
area. This Article attempts to clarify the confusion and dispel
the misconceptions.
To evaluate coherently the current status of mortgage accel-
eration requires a review of the basics in this area which were
established in 1930 in the leading case of Graf v. Hope Building
Corp.4 This Article will then differentiate the types of default as
they relate to acceleration and the more recent cases which pur-
port to enfeeble the Graf doctrine.
II. Basic Prerequisites
Understanding the manner in which case law treats the con-
cept of acceleration invites attention to some basics. Pursuit of a
foreclosure action arises only when there is some breach of the
mortgage by the mortgagor and the full amount of a mortgage
does not become due simply because an installment is not paid
within the applicable grace period.5 What breach will trigger ac-
celeration depends upon the way the mortgage is written and
4. Id.
5. 446 West 44th St., Inc. v. Riverland Holding Corp., 267 A.D. 135, 44 N.Y.S.2d 766
(1st Dep't 1943); Blackman v. Edison, 31 Misc. 2d 746, 221 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1961).
19881
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the statutory and case law interpretations of those words.
Although mortgage provisions can vary widely, acceleration
clauses are usually adapted from the long accepted New York
Board of Title Underwriters' form, which in turn includes those
provisions specifically construed by statute.' Typically, in rele-
vant part,8 the acts of commission or omission authorizing accel-
eration include:
-default in payment of an installment of principal or inter-
est for fifteen days;'
-default in the payment of any tax, water rate, sewer rent,
or assessments after notice and demand;10
-actual or threatened demolition or removal of any building
on the premises without written consent of the mortgagee;
-failure to maintain the buildings on the premises in reason-
ably good repair;
-failure to comply with any requirement or order of notice
of violation of law or ordinance issued by any governmental de-
partment within a stated period of issuance thereof.
Should the mortgagor violate any of these provisions, the
assumption emerges that the mortgagee would have the option
to declare the entire principal balance immediately due. Predict-
ably, it is not quite that simple.
III. Relevant Mechanics
How and when acceleration is manifested influences deci-
sions on the subject and is therefore noteworthy. While accelera-
tion clauses can be couched in terms rendering them self-execut-
ing, they are rarely written that way. Although there is a limited
6. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254 subds. 2,4,4-a,6,7 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1988).
7. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254 (McKinney 1968). Theoretically, there is no limit to
acceleration provisions which may be adapted or crafted by different lenders and their
counsel, especially considering the specifics of a particular transaction. But as a general
rule, the tenor of these provisions is standard.
8. Neither every default found in the standard NYBTU form, Form 8014/8-81-20M,
nor those which might be found in other forms of mortgage will be delineated. Rather,
only those with reasonable practical application - those previously litigated - will be
set forth.
9. Fifteen days is the standard grace period in the NYBTU form of mortgage. While
typical, it is open to negotiation and could be shorter or longer.
10. The usual notice provision is thirty days, although this too could be shorter or
longer.
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minority view that the usual acceleration provision is self-opera-
tive,11 the majority position is clearly to the contrary. 12
Thus, a mortgagee has the option of declaring or not declar-
ing an acceleration.' 3 "Any other holding would take the option
of accelerating or not accelerating away from the [mortgagee],
for whose benefit the clause is placed in the contract, and give
it to the [mortgagor].""' Consequently, adopting a rule of auto-
matic acceleration would anomalously enable a debtor, for exam-
ple, obligated to pay a high rate of interest for a lengthy period,
to compel a mortgagee to accept immediate payment of the debt
by deliberately defaulting - contrary to the intention of the
parties and to the detriment of the mortgagee. 5
A. Default as a Prerequisite
Before the election to accelerate can be considered, there
must be some default, 6 a concept more evasive than it appears.
For example, in one case17 a mortgage had a clause providing
that the mortgagee could opt to accelerate upon fifteen days de-
fault in payment of principal or interest or after thirty days de-
fault in payment of taxes or water or sewer charges, after notice
and demand. After learning of defaults in payment of taxes and
water and sewer charges, the mortgagee sent a notice on Decem-
ber 22 demanding immediate payment of those items and exhi-
11. Banzer v. Richter, 68 Misc. 192, 123 N.Y.S. 678 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1910),
aff'd, 146 A.D. 913, 131 N.Y.S. 1103 (2d Dep't 1911).
12. Sherwood v. Greene, 41 A.D.2d 881, 342 N.Y.S.2d 990 (3d Dep't 1973); Seligman
v. Burg, 233 A.D. 221, 251 N.Y.S. 689 (2d Dep't 1931); Tymon v. Wolitzer, 39 Misc. 2d
504, 240 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963); Gold v. Vanden Brul, 28 Misc. 2d
644, 211 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961); Zausmer v. Suozzi, 23 Misc. 2d
783, 198 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), modified on other grounds, 11 A.D.2d
791, 205 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1960); Wurzler v. Clifford, 36 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1942); In re Steinway, 174 Misc. 554, 21 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1940); Purpura v. Pizzuro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y.C. City Ct. Bronx County 1947);
Candee, Smith & Howland Co. v. Bendish Contracting Co., 148 Misc. 262, 265 N.Y.S. 737
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1933).
13. Tymon, 39 Misc. 2d at 510, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 895; Keene Five Cent Sav. Bank v.
Reid, 123 F. 221, 227 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 567 (1903).
14. Tymon, 39 Misc. 2d at 510, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
15. Id. at 510-11, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
16. King v. Giordano, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County);
Dale Holding Corp. v. Dale Gardens, Inc., 186 Misc. 940, 59 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1945).
17. King v. Giordano, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 3.
1988]
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bition of paid receipts within ten days. When the mortgagor
failed to comply the mortgagee elected to accelerate. The tax
items were paid on January 11, within the thirty-day grace pe-
riod provided in the mortgage. When the mortgagor in the
meanwhile tendered the January check on the ninth of that
month, it was rejected by the mortgagee.
Since the mortgagor was entitled to a thirty-day grace pe-
riod to pay the taxes, with taxes actually paid within that time,
the letter of December 22 - even if otherwise valid as to
form - was premature and could not be a valid election to
accelerate.18
Of similar import are these facts.' 9 Payments were due pur-
suant to the mortgage on the fifteenth of each month with a
twelve-day grace period. On December 26, at 6:45 p.m., payment
was mailed. The mortgagee had not yet received the check on
the last day of the grace period, December 27, and consequently
sent a telegram declaring the acceleration. On December 28, the
check arrived and the mortgagor came in person to tender cash.
The tender was refused, and the check was returned. Accelera-
tion was held invalid. The mortgagor had until midnight of the
last day of the grace period to tender the payment. Thus, the
acceleration telegram had been sent before a default existed and
was unavailing. Mortgagor's tender the next day had to be
accepted.20
B. Notice Requirements
Some mortgages, most notably the Federal National Mort-
gage Association (FNMA) version, 2 require notice of default as
a prerequisite to acceleration. Since a mortgage is a contract, 22 if
the agreement of the parties so provides, it will be enforced.
However, absent clear language mandating notice, it will not be
necessary.23
18. Id.
19. See Dale Holding Corp., 186 Misc. 940, 59 N.Y.S.2d 210.
20. Id. at 944, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
21. See generally N. PENNEY, R. BROUDE & R. CUNNINGHAM, LAND FINANCING 151-58
(3d ed. 1984) (FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage).
22. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
23. Typically, however, failure to pay taxes does require notice and a period of time
to cure. The NYBTU form provides thirty days to cure. Other defaults could also require
[Vol. 8:475
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In this regard, an important distinction is that "[t]he fact of
election should not be confused with the notice or manifestation
of such election."2 In other words, that a mortgagee has actually
elected to accelerate - whether by correspondence so declar-
ing, or by filing the summons, complaint, and lis pendens with
the court containing a statement of such election - is not the
same as giving notice of that act. Stated in different terms,
"[n]otice of exercise of an option to accelerate is not required;
[while] an election to exercise the option is required." 5
The rule has consistently been stated that where a mortgage
contains the statutory acceleration clause,26 there is no require-
ment of notice and demand. 7 The mortgagee therefore had "the
right to exercise the acceleration option any time after the expi-
ration of the grace period without serving a notice of default or
demand for payment."2 Nor is it in any way oppressive, uncon-
scionable, or a matter of bad faith or fraud to decline to give
notice of default prior to acceleration.2 9
C. The Act of Acceleration
There should be no doubt that the most common variety of
default is the failure to remit a mortgage payment when due.
For that defalcation, in the absence of a mortgage clause to the
notice so it always depends upon the precise language of the particular mortgage. That
notice is not required to accelerate in most instances is a particularly salient point, since
some courts are offended when no notice is given and employ that as a factor in arguing
against allowing acceleration. See infra notes 142-166 and accompanying text.
24. Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472, 476, 180 N.E. 176,
177 (1932).
25. Gold, 28 Misc. 2d at 644, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (emhasis added).
26. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254 subd. 2, § 258, sched. N (McKinney 1968).
27. Hudson City Sav. Inst. v. Burton, 88 A.D.2d 728, 451 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't
1982); Bowers v. Zaimes, 59 A.D.2d 803, 398 N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1977). See also
Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176; Ferlazzo v. Riley, 278 N.Y. 289, 16
N.E.2d 286 (1938); Pizer v. Herzig, 120 A.D. 102, 105 N.Y.S. 38 (1st Dep't 1907);
Horthorn v. Louis, 52 A.D. 218, 65 N.Y.S. 155 (2d Dep't 1900), aff'd, 170 N.Y. 576, 62
N.E. 1096 (1902); Dale Holding Corp. v. Dale Gardens, Inc., 186 Misc. 940, 59 N.Y.S.2d
210 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945); New York Sec. & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas & Elec.
Light Co., 88 Hun. 569, 34 N.Y.S. 890 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1895), aff'd, 157 N.Y.
689, 51 N.E. 1092 (1898).
28. Bowers, 59 A.D.2d at 767, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 804. Accord, Albertina Realty Co.,
258 N.Y. at 472, 180 N.E. at 176; Ferlazzo, 278 N.Y. at 291, 16 N.E.2d at 287. See also
CARMODY-WAIT, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 92:38 (2d ed. 1967).
29. Ford v. Waxman, 50 A.D.2d 585, 375 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d Dep't 1975).
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contrary, no additional notice or demand is necessary to enable
the mortgagee to exercise his right to insist upon payment of the
full amount due on the mortgage."0
Nevertheless, the election to deem the entire principal due
is an affirmative-1 event that must be made in some way. This
election may occur before the suit is brought.32 Whether the
election is made by letter or in some other fashion, the exercise
must be a clear,3 3 unequivocal,34 overt 5 act.
Where a letter is the mode of exercising the acceleration,
there is no required formality,36 beyond the cited clarity, which
will always be a question of fact. However, the letter must be
sent by or on behalf of all mortgagees.3s Thus, an acceleration
letter made by one mortgagee and not joined by the other has
been held insufficient.38 Once proper authority can be demon-
strated, individuals who can sign the letter include a corporate
officer, a person in charge of mortgage servicing, an agent, a
30. See cases cited supra note 27.
31. 446 West 44th St. Inc. v. Riverland Holding Corp., 267 A.D. 135, 44 N.Y.S.2d
766 (1st Dep't 1943); Cresco Realty Co. v. Clark, 128 A.D. 144, 145, 112 N.Y.S. 550, 551
(2d Dep't 1908); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Miller, 123 Misc. 2d 431, 473 N.Y.S.2d
743 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1984); Zausmer, 23 Misc. 2d at 787-88, 198 N.Y.S.2d at
488; Purpura, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
32. Cresco Realty Co., 128 A.D. at 145, 112 N.Y.S. at 551; Matusak v. Bakiorzynski,
128 Misc. 375, 219 N.Y.S. 29 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1926).
33. Staten Island Sav. Bank v. Carnival, 39 A.D.2d 779, 332 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep't
1972); Seligman, 233 A.D. at 690, 251 N.Y.S. at 222; Randell v. Protter, 150 N.Y.S.2d 240
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956).
34. Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. at 476, 180 N.E. at 177; 446 West 44th St. Inc.,
267 A.D. at 136, 44 N.Y.S.2d at 768; Tymon, 39 Misc. 2d at 511, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 896;
Blackman v. Edison, 31 Misc. 2d 746, 747, 221 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1961); Dale Holding Corp., 186 Misc. at 944, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
35. Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. at 476, 180 N.E. at 177; Jeferne, Inc. v.
Capanegro, 89 A.D.2d 577, 577, 452 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (2d Dep't 1982); Tymon, 39 Misc.
2d at 511, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 896; Blackman, 31 Misc. 2d at 747, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13;
Bolmer Bros. v. Bolmer Constr. Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 530, 535 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1952).
36. A.C. & H.M. Hall Realty Co. v. Bel-De-Bue, Inc., 72 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947). The only possible formality would be compliance with special mail-
ing or delivery requirements which may be specified in the mortgage documents. It then
becomes a matter of contract. Neither the NYBTU form nor any other typical mortgages
normally contain such provisions.
37. Seligman, 233 A.D. at 222, 251 N.Y.S. at 690; Lapidus v. Kollel Avreichim Torah
Veyirah, 114 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 451 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1982).
38. Seligman, 233 A.D. at 222, 251 N.Y.S. at 690; Lapidus, 114 Misc. 2d at 452, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 959.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/1
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bookkeeper, a husband, or a wife. 9
Filing the summons, complaint, and lis pendens with the
county clerk has repeatedly been held to be the type of unequiv-
ocal overt act sufficient to evidence the election to accelerate.40
As is stated in Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp.,41
the most oft-cited case on this point:
It is unnecessary to decide just what a holder of a mortgage must
do to exercise the right of election under an acceleration clause.
We are satisfied, however, that the unequivocal overt act of the
plaintiff in filing the summons and verified complaint and lis
pendens constituted a valid election. It disclosed the choice of the
plaintiff and constituted notice to all third parties of such choice.
To elect is to choose. The fact of election should not be confused
with the notice or manifestation of such election. The complaint
recited that the plaintiff had elected. The mere fact that before
the summons could be served, the defendant made a tender did
not as a matter of law destroy the effect of the sworn statement
that plaintiff had elected.42
Although the cited concept is unassailable, there are other
factors to be considered. For example, where the relief sought in
the complaint filed with the county clerk was not foreclosure,
but rather was for a declaration that the mortgage was a valid
lien on the premises, the filing was held not to meet the test of
an unequivocal overt act.43
When a mortgagee sends a letter to the mortgagor clearly
manifesting the election to accelerate, whether the subsequent
complaint filed with the court specifically contains a statement
of election to have the entire principal become due is irrelevant
because acceleration has already occurred. Since demonstrating
39. A.C. & H.M. Hall Realty Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
40. Lapidus, 114 Misc. 2d at 452, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 959. See also Albertina Realty
Co., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176 (1932); Northampton Nat'l Bank v. Kidder, 106 N.Y.
221, 12 N.E. 577 (1887); Logue v. Young, 94 A.D.2d 827, 463 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d Dep't
1983); Franklin Soc'y Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Far-Pap Corp., 57 A.D.2d 607, 393
N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1977); Fifty-Second St. Operating Corp. v. Regus Realty Corp.,
236 A.D. 497, 260 N.Y.S. 28 (1st Dep't 1932), af'd, 261 N.Y. 672, 185 N.E. 786 (1933);
Pizer, 120 A.D. 102, 105 N.Y.S. 38; King, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 3.
41. 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176.
42. Id. at 476, 180 N.E. at 177.
43. Aliperti v. Larsen, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1979, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County).
1988]
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the acceleration by letter is so common, issues about the con-
tents of the complaint regarding acceleration language are not
prevalent. But it has happened.
If an acceleration letter is not sent, then the complaint must
recite the acceleration for its filing with the court to be an exer-
cise of the option."' Moreover, even filing a complaint with ap-
propriate acceleration language will be ineffective if a tender of
arrears had previously been made. If that tender comes after an
ineffective acceleration letter, but before the filing of the com-
plaint, the latter cannot cure the defect."
If an acceleration letter is sent, or the declaration is made
orally,48 it must be, as previously set forth, unequivocal. Thus, a
statement by mortgagee to mortgagor to see his lawyer was held
insufficient as an acceleration.47 Similarly, where a letter relied
upon by the mortgagee simply inquired as to when past due
taxes would be paid, calling attention to the acceleration clause,
it was found not to be a valid acceleration. 48 Nor is a letter re-
questing that future payments be made promptly considered to
be sufficiently unequivocal.' 9 Sometimes a purported correspon-
dence is couched in terms of advising as to default and reciting
that if payment is not forthcoming, acceleration will result. As-
serting in some demand, however, that a foreclosure or accelera-
tion will occur in the future, is not a valid acceleration.5"
Likewise, a mere mental operation to accelerate will be un-
availing.5 1 Thus, a decision to accelerate followed by the order-
ing of a foreclosure search is not sufficient to effectuate
44. Walsh v. Henel, 226 A.D. 198, 200, 235 N.Y.S. 34, 36 (4th Dep't 1929); Logue, 94
A.D.2d at 827, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 121; Equitable Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mansfield,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7, 1968, at 19, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County).
45. Lapidus, 114 Misc. 2d at 452, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 959. See also Seligman, 233 A.D.
221, 251 N.Y.S. 689; Walsh, 226 A.D. 198, 235 N.Y.S. 34; King, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978,
at 15, col. 3.
46. While oral exercise of the right is valid, it impacts upon acceleration because
there is always the possibility of a factual dispute as to who said what to whom.
47. Matusak, 128 Misc. at 376, 219 N.Y.S. at 30.
48. Norbant Realty Corp. v. A.C. Oaks, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1952).
49. Lapidus, 114 Misc. 2d at 452, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
50. King, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 3; Norbant Realty Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d
215.
51. Cf. 446 West 44th St. Inc., 267 A.D. 135, 44 N.Y.S.2d 766; Aliperti, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 12, 1979, at 13, col. 5.
[Vol. 8:475
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acceleration.5"
Even when manifestation of acceleration meets the requisite
of clarity and avoids equivocation, nevertheless, it must be made
upon all mortgagors. Notice only to guarantors of the mortgage,
for example, is ineffectual.53
D. Relationship of Tender to Acceleration
When default in paying principal and interest is encoun-
tered, the concept of acceleration is inextricably intertwined
with the subject of tender of arrears. This connection is one of
the most frequently litigated issues on foreclosure law, which
should be readily apparent in observing the dual axioms that a
mortgage does not mature "simply because an installment is not
paid within the grace period"" and that the acceleration clause
is typically not self-executing. 5
Thus, even though a default has occurred, and remains un-
cured after expiration of a grace period, the mortgagor is still
free to tender all arrears subsequent to the default, so long as it
is prior to the mortgagee's exercise of the election to accelerate."
Moreover, "a valid tender of a sum sufficient to expunge fully all
defaults prior to" acceleration is a total defense to foreclosure
based upon an acceleration clause.5
Stated conversely, tender of arrears subsequent to proper
acceleration need not be accepted by the mortgagee and is
52. 446 West 44th St. Inc., 267 A.D. 135, 44 N.Y.S.2d 766; Aliperti, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
12, 1979, at 13, col. 5.
53. Lapidus, 114 Misc. 2d at 452, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
54. Blackman, 31 Misc. 2d at 747, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. Hudson City Say. Inst., 88 A.D.2d at 728, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 856. See also Alber-
tina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. at 176; Jeferne, Inc., 89 A.D.2d 577, 452
N.Y.S.2d 236; Dime Say. Bank v. Norris, 78 A.D.2d 691, 432 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't
1980); Sherwood, 41 A.D.2d 881, 342 N.Y.S.2d 990; Staten Island Say. Bank, 39 A.D.2d
779, 332 N.Y.S.2d 728; 446 West 44th St. Inc., 267 A.D. 135, 44 N.Y.S.2d 766; Seligman,
233 A.D. 221, 251 N.Y.S. 689; Cresco Realty Co., 128 A.D. 144, 112 N.Y.S. 550; Lapidus,
114 Misc. 2d at 451, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 958; King, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 3;
Tymon, 39 Misc. 2d 504, 240 N.Y.S.2d 888; Randell, 150 N.Y.S.2d 240; Matusak, 128
Misc. 375, 219 N.Y.S. 31.
57. Sherwood, 41 A.D.2d at 881, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 991. See also Hudson City Say.
Inst., 88 A.D.2d 728, 451 N.Y.S.2d 855; Bieber v. Goldberg, 133 A.D. 207, 117 N.Y.S. 211
(2d Dep't 1909); Call v. LaBrie, 116 A.D.2d 1034, 498 N.Y.S.2d 652 (4th Dep't 1986).
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wholly unavailing.5 s  Timely rejection of such purported
tender - to avoid any claim of waiver - is therefore
authorized.5 9
The right to tender arrears is not, however, to be confused
with the right to redeem on the mortgage. An indispensable
component of every mortgage, and therefore every foreclosure
action, is the legal right of the owner of the land to redeem it
from the lien of the mortgage. This right has been favored by
equity courts.6 0 At any time before the actual auction sale under
a judgment of foreclosure, the owner of the equity of redemption
always has the right to redeem by paying the full amount of
principal, interest, and costs, as well as any other sums which
the court may find due pursuant to the mortgage.6 1 If the mort-
gagee declines to accept the full amount due on the mortgage,
the mortgagor may avail himself of the provisions of Real Prop-
erty Actions and Proceedings Law section 192162 and compel
discharge of the mortgage by issuance of a satisfaction.6
When issues of acceleration and tender clash, as they fre-
quently do, it becomes essential to determine just what consti-
tutes a tender. A number of principles are applicable. "Delivery
of a check in purported payment of an obligation is not a valid
58. Logue, 94 A.D.2d at 827, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 121-22. Cf. Albertina Realty Co., 258
N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176; Dime Say. Bank v. Dooley, 84 A.D.2d 804, 444 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d
Dep't 1981); Bowers, 59 A.D.2d 803, 398 N.Y.S.2d 766; Fiedler v. Schefer, 54 A.D.2d 751,
387 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1976); Nelson v. Vinel, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 792, 273 N.Y.S.2d 652
(1st Dep't 1966); Dime Say. Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc. 2d 837, 325 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971); Balzarano v. Bertino, 37 Misc. 2d 597, 236 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1962); Bolmer Bros., 114 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952).
59. Cf. Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2d Dep't
1971); Nelson, 26 A.D.2d 792, 273 N.Y.S.2d 652.
60. Goodell v. Silver Creek Nat'l Bank, 48 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua
County), aff'd mem., 268 A.D. 1020, 53 N.Y.S.2d 529 (4th Dep't 1944).
61. Nutt v. Cuming, 155 N.Y. 309, 49 N.E. 880 (1898); Nelson v. Loder, 132 N.Y.
288, 30 N.E. 369 (1892); Kotright v. Cady, 21 N.Y. 343 (1860); Belsid Holding Corp. v.
Dahm, 12 A.D.2d 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1960). Mann v. Sterling Holding Corp.,
14 Misc. 2d 818, 179 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958); When the phrases
"sale" or "actual sale" are employed, they are intended to mean the auction sale, which
precedes the passing of actual title at the closing between referee and bidder. Thus, the
right to redeem is extinguished when the property is struck down at the auction. See
Tuthill v. Tracy, 31 N.Y. 157 (1865); Barnard v. Jersey, 39 Misc. 212, 79 N.Y.S. 380 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1902); Brown v. Frost, 10 Paige Ch. 243 (N.Y. Ch. 1843).
62. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 1921 (McKinney 1979).
63. In re Joshua Assocs., 104 A.D.2d 334, 335, 479 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1st Dep't 1984).
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tender if there are insufficient funds on deposit in the account
on which the check is drawn." ' A tender implies that the mort-
gagor is ready and able to perform, which cannot be the case if
funds are insufficient.15 Similarly, a check drawn on uncollected
funds could not support a tender. 6 A mortgage payment was
due on March 17. The grace period expired on April 7. On April
3, a check in the full amount due was mailed. On that day, the
mortgagor's bank account was insufficient to cover the check
written to pay the mortgage installment. However, on that same
day and the next day, checks sufficient to cover the mortgage
installment were deposited for collection. On April 8, the mort-
gagor's check was returned uncollected because it was drawn
against uncollected deposits. The resultant foreclosure was ruled
valid and the mortgagee's conduct under the circumstances not
unconscionable.
Similarly, an offer to pay does not constitute a tender.6
When a mortgagor "promises" to pay the obligation, as is so
often done, he has done nothing. A promise or offer is not the
equivalent of an actual tender.6 9 An offer to pay arrears does not
cure a default.7 0 Stated another way, a valid tender requires "not
only readiness and ability to perform, but actual production of
the thing to be delivered, . . .mortgage payment arrearages. '71
When a tender is actually made, it must be for the full
amount of arrears due. A tender of less than the complete sum
due is not deemed a tender.
64. Dime Say. Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc. 2d at 838, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
65. Id. (quoting Eddy v. Davis, 116 N.Y. 247, 251, 22 N.E. 362, 363 (1889)).
66. Weirfield Holding Corp. v. Pless & Seeman, Inc., 257 N.Y. 536, 537, 178 N.E.
784, 784-85 (1931). It is noteworthy that some decisions purporting to refute Graf ignore
the existence of Weirfield Holding Corp.
67. Id. at 536-37, 178 N.E. at 784.
68. Jamaica Say. Bank v. Sutton, 42 A.D.2d 856, 346 N.Y.S.2d 847 (2d Dep't 1973);
Ponce De Leon Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nemeroff, 28 A.D.2d 668, 280 N.Y.S.2d 632
(1st Dep't 1967); Lipwal Holding Corp. v. Martens, 270 A.D. 935, 61 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d
Dep't 1946); New York Util. Co. v. Williamsburg Steam Laundry Co., 187 A.D. 110, 175
N.Y.S. 60 (2d Dep't 1919).
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. Lipwal Holding Corp., 270 A.D. at 936, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
71. Jamaica Say. Bank, 42 A.D.2d at 857, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (citing Eddy, 116
N.Y. 247, 22 N.E. 362; New York Util. Co., 187 A.D. 110, 175 N.Y.S. 60).
72. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 88 A.D.2d at 727, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 856; Sherwood, 41
A.D.2d at 882, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 991; Bieber, 133 A.D. 207, 117 N.Y.S. 211; Mahoney v.
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For a tender, even of the full amount due, to be effective, it
must be submitted unconditionally.7 3 Thus, when a mortgagor
sent a check for the full arrears, but conditioned the submission
upon the out-of-state mortgagee's appearance in New York to
litigate a charge of fraud, it was held not to be a tender. 4
Another key element is the question of when a tender is
deemed made. A mortgagor in default claimed to have mailed a
check for the full amount due on June 6 between 9:00 p.m. and
10:00 p.m., although the postmark was 1:00 p.m. on June 7. At
9:17 a.m. on June 7, the summons, complaint, and lis pendens
were filed. At 12:30 p.m. that day, service of process was ef-
fected. The check was received at 5:00 p.m. on June 7. The rul-
ing was that the mere mailing of the check did not constitute a
tender.7' The tender was made when the check was received,
which was too late since the summons, complaint, and lis
pendens had already been filed, manifesting the acceleration.76
Assuming a tender is submitted meeting all the tests of va-
lidity, but the mortgagee refuses to accept it, there is no neces-
sity to renew the tender.7 Where an acceleration is made, albeit
invalid, "equity will not require the doing of a vain or useless
thing or the performance of an impossible act."'78
Even though the rules relating to the timing of acceleration
and tender are well established, there can always be latitude for
issues of fact, inferences to be drawn by the trier of the facts, as
well as the court's view of what may be equitable under various
McCollum, 146 Misc. 790, 263 N.Y.S. 628 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1933); Van
Benthuysen v. Central N.E. & W.R. Co., 17 N.Y.S. 709 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1892).
73. Noyes v. Wyckoff, 114 N.Y. 204, 207, 21 N.E. 158, 158 (1889); Shiland v. Loeb,
58 A.D. 565, 566, 69 N.Y.S. 11, 12 (2d Dep't 1901); Balzarano, 37 Misc. 2d at 599, 236
N.Y.S.2d at 251; Wood v. Hitchcock, 20 Wend. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Eddy &
Hathaway v. O'Hara, 14 Wend. 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
74. Balzarano, 37 Misc. 2d at 599, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
75. Bolmer Bros., 114 N.Y.S.2d at 535-36.
76. Id.
77. Strassbourger v. Leerburger, 233 N.Y. 55, 134 N.E. 834 (1922); Mandelberg v.
Lampert, 246 A.D. 763, 763, 283 N.Y.S. 937, 938 (2d Dep't 1935); Mahnk v. Blanchard,
233 A.D. 555, 253 N.Y.S. 307 (4th Dep't 1931); Katz v. Sardove Realty Corp., 212
N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961); Margulis v. Messinger, 34 Misc. 2d 699,
703, 210 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960).
78. Margulis, 34 Misc. 2d at 703, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 859; Jacobs v. Dakamont Explora-
tion Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1959, at 8, col. 7; 30 C.J.S. Equity §16 (1965).
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circumstances. In one case,79 the mortgage installment was due
on April 11, with a fifteen-day grace period. The payment was
dated on April 27, one day after expiration of the grace period.
The postmark was April 29, and the check was not received by
the mortgagee until May 2. On May 3, the mortgagee's attorney
returned the check advising the mortgagors that they were in
default and that the mortgagee elected to accelerate the entire
balance. Not until reply papers on the motion for summary
judgment did plaintiff claim an intervening acceleration letter of
April 27, sent by regular mail. The mortgagors asserted that
they never received such a letter. If the letter of April 27 ever
existed, it would have been a valid acceleration. But the decision
held that the supposed earlier acceleration letter had never been
received. Therefore, tender came before acceleration, and the
foreclosure was dismissed.80 This should not be viewed as weak-
ening the Graf doctrine.81
In another case,a2 a payment was due on November 1. It was
mailed on that date but apparently became lost in the postal
system. The mortgagee accelerated on November 3. The mortga-
gor immediately offered to send a certified check and actually
did so two days later.8" Invoking its equity powers, the court al-
lowed reinstatement and dismissed the foreclosure."4
Since the principles in this area are so cogently set forth,
there is a modicum of certainty with most fact patterns. But
when the mails are involved, or where the record is unclear, or
where the courts may suspect a lack of candor, it is easier for the
established rules to fall to the general equity principles long es-
tablished in the arena of mortgage foreclosure. Thus, this is one
area where the Graf principles may have been subjected to tacit
79. Randell v. Protter, 150 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956).
80. Id. at 242.
81. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see supra notes 54-57 and accompany-
ing text.
82. Nove Holding Corp. v. Schechter, 218 A.D. 479, 218 N.Y.S. 623 (1st Dep't 1926).
83. Id. at 481, 483, 487, 218 N.Y.S. at 625, 627, 630.
84. Id. at 488, 218 N.Y.S. at 630. See also Trowbridge v. Malex Realty Corp., 198
A.D. 656, 191 N.Y.S. 97 (1st Dep't 1921). For other examples of factual issues concerning
acceleration and tender, see Presidential Life Ins. Co. v. Saxon, 53 A.D.2d 624, 384
N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1976); Staten Island Say. Bank, 39 A.D.2d 779, 332 N.Y.S.2d
728; Battim Ass'n v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 A.D. 1022, 113 N.Y.S.2d 242 (2d Dep't
1952).
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modification although, it is suggested, not with special lucidity.
Graf dealt with an acknowledged default with no issue of a
tender having gone astray.
IV. The Mortgage as a Contract
Having examined some of the mechanical requisites of ac-
celeration, we note the exigent basis of the relationship between
mortgagor and mortgagee arising from the documents, typically
a mortgage note or bond (the promise to pay), and the mortgage
(the pledge of security for the promise).
Whatever its terms may be:
A mortgage is a contract and must be construed in accordance
with the intention of the parties as expressed by the language
they chose to employ. Courts cannot supply an omitted term of a
contract under the guise of construction, and where the language
is clear and unambiguous it must be given effect in arriving at the
parties' intent.
A mortgagor's default in the performance of any covenant or
agreement contained in a mortgage does not operate to accelerate
the maturity of the principal debt unless there is a specific stipu-
lation to that effect. An acceleration clause, in order to be en-
forceable so as to mature the entire debt for purposes of foreclo-
sure, must be clear and certain. It will not be supplied by
inference.85
Indeed, "[t]he well-established general rule in New York is
that a mortgagor is bound by the terms of his contract, including
the acceleration clause ... Stated another way, "a mortgagor
is bound by the terms of the contract and cannot be relieved of a
default in the absence of a waiver by the mortgagee, or estoppel,
bad faith, fraud, oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the
latter's part. ' '87
While these maxims are vital to and seem to provide com-
fort for a mortgagee, they are not quite as pervasive in effect as
85. Brayton v. Pappas, 52 A.D.2d 187, 188-89, 383 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (4th Dep't
1976) (citations omitted).
86. Laber v. Minassian, 134 Misc. 2d 543, 545, 511 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County 1987).
87. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Transgrow Realty Corp., 101 A.D.2d 770,
475 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1984).
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they appear. Since there are stated reasons where a court could
choose not to enforce the mortgage contract as written, there are
instances when they will rely upon the "exceptions" to fashion a
remedy perceived as equitable under the circumstances. 8
Where mortgagor's breach of the contract is failure to pay
principal and interest, or violation of the due-on-sale clause, en-
forcement has always been strict. 9 For defaults of other types,
the view tends to be more lenient towards the mortgagor.9 0 In
these latter situations, the Graf doctrine seems not to have been
controlling in any event. When neglect to make a payment due
pursuant to the mortgage is at issue, Graf appears to be unas-
sailed. However, some courts have expressed a different and ar-
guably misplaced and ill-conceived idea that the doctrine is
eroding."'
V. Acceleration Strictly Construed
Two varieties of default support a strict interpretation of a
mortgagee's right to accelerate: failure to timely remit an install-
ment of principal and/or interest and breach of the due-on-sale
clause.2 While breach of other covenants or obligations may cer-
tainly support acceleration, enforcement in these other areas is
too uneven and susceptible to exceptions to merit the adjective
"strict."93 This is not to say that traditional views are no longer
applicable. Rather, it has been this way for the greater part of
this century.
A. Principal and Interest Default
Although the courts in New York have always considered a
default in paying principal and interest serious - and most
often have authorized acceleration for such default - prior to
1930, the law was perhaps less than firmly established. But the
year 1930 brought Graf v. Hope Building Corp.,9" the landmark
88. See infra notes 198-245 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 246-325 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 125-197 and accompanying text.
94. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
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court of appeals decision. The most oft-cited case in all of fore-
closure law, this decision set the standard for analyzing defaults
and their relationship to acceleration. With two other cases,9 it
forms a triumvirate of decisions, almost invariably cited when
mortgage defaults are at issue. As a body of law, these cases and
others stand for the proposition that acceleration for failure to
pay principal and interest is neither penalty nor forfeiture. A
mortgagor is bound by the terms of his contract as made. He
cannot be relieved of default in the absence of fraud, waiver by
the mortgagee, estoppel, or oppressive or unconscionable con-
duct on the mortgagee's part." While the qualifying language
does seem to present room for relief to a mortgagor, the concept
remains, nevertheless, that acceleration for failure to pay princi-
pal and interest will be the basis for acceleration once the grace
period has expired and such acceleration in and of itself is not
unconscionable or oppressive.9 7
In Graf v. Hope Building Corp.,98 the mortgagee was the
holder of two consolidated mortgages. The acceleration clause
contained a twenty-day grace period. The principal of the mort-
gagor's corporation was the only person authorized to sign
checks. Eight years before the maturity date of the mortgage, he
95. Ferlazzo v. Riley, 278 N.Y. 289, 16 N.E.2d 286 (1938); Albertina Realty Co. v.
Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176 (1932).
96. Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 4-6, 171 N.E. 884, 885 (1930); Ferlazzo,
278 N.Y. 289, 292, 16 N.E.2d 286, 287; Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. 472, 475, 180 N.E.
176, 177; National Bank of N. Am. v. Cohen, 89 A.D.2d 725, 726, 453 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851
(3d Dep't 1982); Hudson City Sav. Inst. v. Burton, 88 A.D.2d 728, 729, 451 N.Y.S.2d 855,
856 (3d Dep't 1982); Mariash v. Bastianich, 88 A.D.2d 829, 829, 452 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190
(1st Dep't 1982); Ford v. Waxman, 50 A.D.2d 585, 585, 375 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146-47 (2d
Dep't 1975); Albany Sav. Bank v. Clifton Park Equity Developers, Ltd., 46 A.D.2d 823,
824, 360 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (3d Dep't 1974); Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743,
743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471, 471 (2d Dep't 1971); Kelmenson v. Boulevard Constr. Corp., 232
A.D. 847, 847, 249 N.Y.S. 46, 46 (2d Dep't 1931); Pizer v. Herzig, 120 A.D. 102, 105
N.Y.S. 38 (1st Dep't 1907); Gratton v. Dido Realty Co., 89 Misc. 2d 401, 403, 391
N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63
Misc. 2d 863, 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1970); Bolmer Bros.
v. Bolmer Constr. Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 530, 536 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952); A.C. &
H.M. Hall Realty Co. v. Bel-De-Bue, Inc., 72 N.Y.S.2d 659, 682-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1947); Armstrong v. Rogdon Holding Corp., 139 Misc. 549, 551, 247 N.Y.S. 682, 684 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1930).
97. See cases cited supra notes 31-53 concerning manifestation of the acceleration;
see supra note 96.
98. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
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was departing for Europe. Prior to leaving, a clerk in his employ
computed the interest believed to be due. That computation was
erroneous. The principal signed the check and went to Europe.
Before the date the interest was due, the error was discovered,
the mortgagee was advised of the discrepancy and told that
when the officer returned from Europe, the balance would be
paid. Until that time, only a check for the smaller amount would
be forwarded. That check was sent to the mortgagee, was depos-
ited, and was paid. When the principal of the corporation re-
turned, another error was made and he was not informed of the
default in the payment of interest. When twenty-one days ex-
pired - one day after the grace period - the foreclosure ac-
tion was begun. It was only then that the mortgagor tendered
the deficiency. The mortgagee, however, insisted upon its con-
tract rights, refused the tender, and continued with its foreclo-
sure action.9 9 In ruling for the mortgagee, upholding the acceler-
ation, and rejecting the tender by the mortgagor, the court of
appeals stated in relevant part as follows:
On the undisputed facts as found, we are unable to perceive any
defense to the action .... [The lender] may be ungenerous, but
generosity is a voluntary attribute and cannot be enforced ....
Here there is no penalty, no forfeiture, nothing except a covenant
fair on its face to which both parties willingly consented. It is
neither oppressive nor unconscionable. In the absence of some act
by the [lender] which a court of equity would be justified in con-
sidering unconscionable, he is entitled to the benefit of the cove-
nant. The contract is definite and no reason appears for its refor-
mation by the courts. We are not at liberty to revise while
professing to construe. Defendant's mishap, caused by a succes-
sion of its errors and negligent omissions, is not of the nature re-
quiring relief from its default. Rejection of plaintiff['s] legal right
could rest only on compassion for defendant's negligence. Such a
tender emotion must be exerted, if at all, by the parties rather
than by the court. Our guide must be the precedents prevailing
since courts of equity were established in this state. Stability of
contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympa-
thy. To allow this judgment to stand would constitute an interfer-
ence by this court between parties whose contract is clear.1"'
99. Id. at 3-4, 171 N.E. at 884-85.
100. Id. at 4-5, 171 N.E. at 885 (citations omitted).
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Thus, sympathy is not to be an element considered where
acceleration is based upon a default in paying principal and in-
terest.1 1 Stated another way, equity may not relieve from de-
fault merely because the mortgagee has acted aggressively or
where the results are harsh.10 2 Hence, electing the acceleration
one day after expiration of the grace period for the mortgage
payment will be upheld,103 as will, an election three days"0 or six
days'06 after the grace period.
This strict construction of the acceleration clause has also
been expressed in findings that "acceleration clauses exist solely
for the benefit of the mortgagee,"' 06 "and to make the security
more effective ....
Clearly then, when a mortgage payment is not made in a
timely manner, and the applicable grace period has expired, the
mortgagee may manifest the election to accelerate. 08
B. Due-On-Sale Clause
Although a due-on-sale provision is not a standard
clause - and is not found in the NYBTU form of mort-
gage - astute lenders will most often include it in their mort-
gages. Essentially, it is a contractual agreement authorizing the
mortgagee to immediately declare due the entire balance of prin-
cipal and interest if the property securing the loan is sold or oth-
erwise conveyed.10 9
The clause is of relatively recent vintage. Up until approxi-
101. Laber v. Minassian, 134 Misc. 2d 543, 546, 511 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1987).
102. Shell Oil Co. v. McGraw, 48 A.D.2d 220, 222, 368 N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (4th Dep't
1975); Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743, 744, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (2d Dep't
1971).
103. Graf, 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884.
104. Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176.
105. Bolmer Bros., 114 N.Y.S.2d 530.
106. Nutman v. Aetna Business Credit Inc., 115 Misc. 2d 168, 169, 453 N.Y.S.2d 586,
587 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982). See also Stith, 63 Misc. 2d at 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d at
808.
107. Stith, 63 Misc. 2d at 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
108. Graf, 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884.
109. The subject of due-on-sale clauses is itself worthy of lengthy analysis beyond
the scope of this article. For a detailed review of the applicable case law, see Bergman,
Due on Sale in New York: Clearer with Time?, 58 NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL 27
(May 1986).
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mately the late 1960's, the existence of stable interest rates
meant that sales of property encumbered by a mortgage had no
deleterious effect upon the lender. When rates became volatile,
continuation of older mortgages, at what became below-market
interest rates, adversely impacted upon profitability of lenders'
mortgage portfolios. That problem precipitated insertion of the
due-on-sale provisions in mortgages.
Just as the courts have upheld acceleration for failure to
pay principal and interest, a clear majority of the cases have up-
held acceleration for breach of the due-on-sale clause. 110
Lenders derive additional assurance from section 341 of the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198211 (the
"Act"), which pre-empts any state law prohibitions upon exer-
cise of the due-on-sale clause. 1 2
Section 341(a)(1) of the Act defines "due-on-sale clause" as:
"a contract provision which authorizes a lender, at its option, to
declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's security
instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest
therein, securing the real property loan is sold or transferred
without the lender's prior written consent. . .. "'I'
While that definition appears all-encompassing, section
341(b)(2) of the Act provides that:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in .. . [section 3411(d), the exer-
110. Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Marks, 91 A.D.2d 1010, 457 N.Y.S.2d 881 (2d
Dep't 1983); Bonady Apartments, Inc. v. Columbia Banking Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 119
Misc. 2d 923, 465 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1983); Newburgh Sav. Bank v.
Grossman, 118 Misc. 2d 1036, 462 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982); Ceravolo
v. Buckner, 111 Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1981); First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, 109 Misc. 2d 715, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1981); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Sav. Bank, 90 Misc.
2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977). See Stith, 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313
N.Y.S.2d 804.
111. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C.). There are some exceptions to the preemption, not relevant to this article. For a
more detailed review of Garn-St Germain, see Coleman, Federal Preemption of State
Law Prohibitions on the Exercise of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 100 BANKING L.J. 772 (Nov.-
Dec. 1983); Barad & Layden, Due-on-Sale Law as Preempted by the Garn-St Germain
Act, 12 REAL ESTATE L. J. 138 (Fall 1983).
112. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 341(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. §
1701j-3(b)(1) (1983).
113. Id. § 341(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (1983).
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cise by the lender of its option pursuant to such a clause shall be
exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all
rights and remedies of the lender and the borrower shall be fixed
and governed by the contract. " 4
Thus, the significance of this pre-emption nevertheless
seems to necessitate reference to the draftsmanship and precise
terms of each due-on-sale provision at issue. Since most of the
field is indeed pre-empted, only the unusual situation should
raise any questions. In this regard the view in New York has
always been virtually uncompromising.
To review, arguments that the purchaser's financial position
was superior to that of the seller-mortgagor have been rejected
as a basis to vitiate enforcement of the due-on-sale clause." 5
Similarly found wanting was the claim that the clause is an ille-
gal restraint upon alienation.Y6 Nor is the lender's motive in ac-
celerating for violation of due-on-sale to be considered.1 1 7
A land sale contract has been found to run afoul of the due-
on-sale clause where the provision called for acceleration upon
"transfer of all or part" of the subject premises, the court find-
ing significance in the passage of equitable title." Of like im-
port was the upholding of the due-on-sale clause arising from a
corporate dissolution. 1 9
114. Id. § 341(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(2) (1983).
115. Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583.
116. Ceravolo, 111 Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861; First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
109 Misc. 2d 715, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373.
117. Bonady Apartments, Inc., 119 Misc. 2d 923, 465 N.Y.S.2d 150; Ceravolo, 111
Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861.
118. Ceravolo, 111 Misc. 2d at 679, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (citing Elterman v. Hyman,
192 N.Y. 113, 84 N.E. 937 (1908); Williams v. Haddock, 145 N.Y. 144, 39 N.E. 825 (1895);
Sloan v. Pinafore Homes, Inc., 38 A.D.2d 718, 329 N.Y.S.2d 420 (2d Dep't 1972); Occi-
dental Realty Co. v. Palmer, 117 A.D. 505, 102 N.Y.S. 648 (1st Dep't 1907), af'd, 192
N.Y. 588, 85 N.E. 1113 (1908); Marine Midland Bank - N.Y. v. Batson, 70 Misc. 2d 8, 332
N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972); Van Curler Dev. Corp. v. City of Schenec-
tady, 59 Misc. 2d 621, 300 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1969); Charles v.
Scheibel, 128 Misc. 275, 218 N.Y.S. 545 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1926), aff'd, 221
A.D. 816, 222 N.Y.S. 784 (4th Dep't 1927)). See also Newburgh Say. Bank, 118 Misc. 2d
1036, 462 N.Y.S.2d 92.
119. Bonady Apartments, Inc., 119 Misc. 2d 923, 465 N.Y.S.2d 150 (citing In re
Loes' Will, 55 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1945)). See also Mutual Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
Although of less importance with the passage of Garn-St Germain, note the tacit statu-
tory recognition of the due-on-sale clauses in New York found in Real Property Law §
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In a small minority of cases, the due-on-sale clause has not
been upheld. In some, the courts have relied upon equity princi-
ples to deny enforcement.12 It would appear, however, that the
existence of the Act, assuming the point is argued, would pre-
clude similar results in the future. The few other cases denying
enforcement were based upon apparent deficiencies in the
breadth or exactitude of the clauses themselves. For example,
where consent to assumption was not to be unreasonably with-
held, the court construed the language against the drafter and
refused to enforce the clause. 1' When the clause imposed con-
straint upon the lender's decision (i.e., provided that the acceler-
ation had to be based upon factors neither arbitrary nor unrea-
sonable), the court again ruled against the lender-drafter seeking
a higher rate of interest from the new owner. 22 Finally, when
the clause narrowly provided for acceleration solely upon "sale"
of the property, sale of the stock of the corporate mortgagor was
held not to fall within the proscription of a sale of the
property.23
The status of the due-on-sale clause as the subject of strict
enforcement appears unchanged. Enforcement was always firm,
save the unusual cases where courts felt overwhelmed by equity
considerations - now rendered moot by the Act. Where the
due-on-sale clause is less than artfully drawn, the breach
claimed by the lender may not, as a matter of legal inference,
exist. Since there must always first be a default before any accel-
eration clause can be exercised,2 4 refusal to enforce under such
circumstances is not untoward. Hence, the Graf doctrine is not
under attack here.
254-a, enacted in 1972 and amended in 1974. It acknowledges the validity and enforce-
ability of the clause but precludes collection of a prepayment penalty when it is invoked.
N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
120. Home Say. Bank v. Baer Properties, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 98, 99-100, 460 N.Y.S.2d
833, 834-35 (3d Dep't 1983); Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 939-41, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426,
427-28 (Dutchess County Ct. 1978).
121. Silver v. Rochester Sav. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't
1980).
122. Iris v. Marine Midland Bank, 114 Misc. 2d 251, 450 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan County 1982).
123. Gasparre v. 88-36 Elmhurst Ave. Realty Corp., 119 Misc. 2d 628, 464 N.Y.S.2d
106 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1983).
124. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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C. Breach of Any Condition
Mortgagees would prefer to assume that the uncompromis-
ing approach attendant to principal and interest defaults and vi-
olation of due-on-sale clauses is extended to other forms of
breach. In a general sense it is. There is authority stating that
breach of any condition of the mortgage can be the basis of a
foreclosure.12 Expressed in different language, "[a] foreclosure
may be based upon the 'non-performance of any act' required by
the mortgage.""2 6 While the ability to accelerate for failure to
pay principal and interest is quite apparent, it may be less obvi-
ous for breach of other covenants, such as the covenant to re-
pair. However, breach of the latter can be the reason accelera-
tion may result. 2 7 At the same time, a default by the mortgagor
"'in the performance of any covenant or agreement contained in
the mortgage does not operate to accelerate the maturity of the
principal debt ... unless there is a specific stipulation to that
effect.' "1128 The acceleration provisions must be clear and certain
and will not be inferred. 129
A requisite corollary to the noted principles is that a mort-
gagee is entitled to insist strictly on his contractual rights. 30
Moreover, "[iln the absence of an estoppel or oppressive and un-
conscionable acts by plaintiff [the mortgagee], the court is duty
bound to enforce the mortgage as written by the parties." ''
Some of the practical implications of these points arise out
of some decisions which follow. In one case, 32 in addition to the
usual obligation for payment, the mortgagors bound themselves
for a period of some eight years to purchase gasoline and all
125. In re Cumberland Garage, Inc., 73 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572-73 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1947); Mills Land Corp. v. Halstead, 184 Misc. 679, 681, 56 N.Y.S.2d 682, 684
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1945).
126. Mills Land Corp., 184 Misc. at 681, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
127. Id.
128. 100 Eighth Ave. Corp. v. Morgenstern, 3 Misc. 2d 410, 415, 150 N.Y.S.2d 471,
476 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956) (quoting 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 495), modified on
other grounds, 4 A.D.2d 754, 164 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1957).
129. Id.
130. Graf, 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884; Gratton, 89 Misc. 2d 401, 391 N.Y.S.2d 954.
131. Gratton, 89 Misc. 2d at 403, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 956. See also Ferlazzo, 278 N.Y.
at 290, 16 N.E.2d at 287; Graf, 254 N.Y. at 4, 171 N.E. at 885; Strochak v. Glass Paper
Making Supplies Co., 239 A.D. 312, 313, 267 N.Y.S. 282, 283 (1st Dep't 1933).
132. Cumberland Garage, 73 N.Y.S.2d 571.
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other petroleum products then or later to be sold at the subject
premises from the mortgagee.13 The mortgage also affirmatively
specified that the provision to purchase gasoline would survive
payment of the principal sum due under the mortgage.3 Prior
to conclusion of the eight-year period during which mortgagor
was to purchase gasoline, it paid all money due on the mortgage
and thereupon applied to the court to have the mortgage dis-
charged.13 5 The court refused to cancel the mortgage, ruling that
"a mortgage may provide for foreclosure upon the breach of any
condition or of a single covenant or condition, and that such a
provision is not regarded as a penalty, and is binding and le-
gal."s 6 In addition, the court held that "a mortgage may be kept
alive, even after payment in full, if such was the intention of the
parties, provided innocent third persons are not thereby
prejudiced.' ' 37
Another case of similar import involved a mortgage where
the mortgagors bound themselves not only to repay the debt,
but also to construct a sewer connection and an alternate drive-
way, along with a number of other obligations.13 8 When the
mortgagors tendered the full balance of the mortgage due with
interest to the date of tender, it was conditioned upon issuance
of a satisfaction. But at that time, neither the sewer nor drive-
way work had been performed. When tender was rejected, mort-
gagors petitioned the court for cancellation of the mortgage. The
decision was in favor of the mortgagee. A valid condition of the
mortgage had not been fulfilled - notwithstanding that all the
money due had been paid. Discharge of the mortgage was
denied.1 39
Accordingly, mortgagees can derive some solace from the
case law in this area. Since a mortgage is a contract - to be
enforced as written 14 0 - and since breach of any condition
133. Id. at 572.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 572-73.
137. Id. at 573. See also Salvin v. Myles Realty Co., 227 N.Y. 51, 56, 124 N.E. 94, 95
(1919).
138. Jeffrey Towers, Inc. v. Straus, 31 A.D.2d 319, 297 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep't
1969).
139. Id. at 324-25, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
140. See supra notes 85, 86 and accompanying text.
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clearly delineated in the documents can be a basis to accelerate,
a mortgagee might consider its position to be secure. While as a
general rule that is correct, not all defalcations under the mort-
gage are viewed by the courts as equally egregious. Virtually un-
swerving application is found in case of defaults for payment of
principal and interest and upon the due-on-sale clause. Beyond
that, otherwise well-founded generalizations about acceleration
for breach of the mortgage are helpful as guidance and perspec-
tive, but cannot be dispositive of all issues. Past this point, eq-
uity begins to play a greater role and diminishes the applicabil-
ity of general rules.1" 1 Defaults of various types are treated
differently. Moreover, there are gradations of severity within
categories - all of which simply state what becomes inelucta-
bly obvious. Most cases other than the previously related catego-
ries will have to be considered on their own factual bases.
VI. Areas of Uncertainty
A. Acceleration for Tax Defaults42
When real property taxes are not paid, the lien of the mort-
gage will ultimately be extinguished when the taxing jurisdiction
divests the mortgagor-owner of his title. Hence, payment of
taxes is a matter of significance to the parties.
Unlike an acceleration provision for default in paying prin-
cipal and interest, where notice of default is not a prerequisite
to acceleration, " s acceleration provisions for tax defaults usually
do mandate notice, demand, and a period to cure - typically
thirty days. 144 Since a mortgage is a contract to be enforced as
141. See supra notes 125-140 and see infra notes 142-197 and accompanying text.
142. Reviewing the specific fact patterns for cases of acceleration upon tax defaults
is an interesting exercise and serves best to make the point that the courts are exception-
ally lenient toward mortgagors in this area. The scope, however, of such detail is beyond
the thrust of this article. For an in-depth review of the subject, see Bergman, When the
Mortgagor Defaults in Real Property Taxes, 56 NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL 24 (Dec.
1984); Bergman, The Dangers of a Mortgagor's Tax Default to an Existing Mortgage, 1
THE PRACTicAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 63 (Jan. 1985).
143. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
144. The relevant portion of paragraph 4 of the standard NYBTU form of mort-
gages provides "that the whole of said principal sum and interest shall become due at the
option of the mortgagee: ... after default in the payment of any tax, water rate, sewer
rent or assessment for thirty days after notice and demand .... NYBTU Form 8014/8-
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written,'" and further since acceleration can be based upon non-
performance of any covenant," 6 a mortgagee might conclude
that upon a tax default, acceleration would be upheld by the
courts. To be sure, there are cases which have affirmatively so
held."4 7 Although perhaps only a statistical observation, these
cases represent a minority of the reported decisions. Most often,
the courts decline to uphold acceleration and foreclosure for tax
defaults 14 8 not incidentally creating a perplexing problem for
mortgagees.
In synthesizing the elements necessary to maintain accelera-
tion for tax defaults, the cases reveal that some, or a combina-
tion of all of the following factors must be found: tax defaults
81-20M. Although this thirty-day period is usual, it could be more or less, depending
upon the agreement of the parties. While exercising the notice provision in this area is
possible, it is not often encountered.
145. See supra notes 85, 86 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 125-139, 141 and accompanying text.
147. Barclay's Bank v. Smitty's Ranch, Inc., 122 A.D.2d 323, 504 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d
Dep't 1986); The East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Carlinde Realty Corp., 54 A.D.2d 574, 387
N.Y.S.2d 138 (2d Dep't 1976), affd, 42 N.Y.2d 905, 366 N.E.2d 1357, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(1977); Fiedler v. Schefer, 54 A.D.2d 751, 387 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1976); Jamaica
Sav. Bank v. Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2d Dep't 1971); Strochak v. Glass
Paper Making Supplies Co., 239 A.D. 312, 267 N.Y.S. 282 (1st Dep't 1933); Fifty-Second
St. Operating Corp. v. Regus Realty Corp., 236 A.D. 497, 260 N.Y.S. 28 (1st Dep't 1932),
aff'd, 261 N.Y. 672, 185 N.E. 786 (1933); Jamaica Say. Bank v. Alley Spring Apartments
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 1980, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); Jamaica Sav. Bank
v. Avon Assocs., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Shaker Cent.
Trust Fund v. Crusade For Christ, Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 825, 215 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. Co-
lumbia County 1960); Armstrong v. Rogdon Holding Corp., 139 Misc. 549, 247 N.Y.S. 682
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); New York Baptist Mission Soc'y v. Tabernacle Baptist
Church, 17 Misc. 699, 41 N.Y.S. 513 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1896).
148. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1982); Central
Nat'l Bank v. Paton, 109 Misc. 2d 42, 439 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1981);
King v. Giordano, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1978, at 15, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County); Calta v.
Belkin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1971, at 2, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Weber v. Berkowitz,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1970, at 20, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Kings County); Brookman v. 12662 Realty
Corp., N.Y.L.J., July 6,1970, at 11, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County); Lincoln Sav. Bank v.
Six Moffat Realty Co., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1970, at 15, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. Kings County);
Clark-Robinson Corp. v. Jet Enter., 159 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1957);
Norbant Realty Corp. v. A.C. Oaks, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1952); Seaman's Bank for Sav. v. Wallenstein Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1938); York v. Hucko, 146 Misc. 201, 262 N.Y.S. 62 (Sup. Ct. Madison
County 1933); Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 124 A.D. 814, 109 N.Y.S. 435 (1st Dep't
1908); Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 316 (1891).
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are substantial;" 9 notice is timely'50 and clearly given; 5' at-
tempts to cure either do not exist or are patently insincere; 52
and the excuse offered for default is not sufficient to constitute a
defense.' 53
As noted, however, the decisions will most often reject fore-
closure for tax defaults. Foremost, this seemingly incongruous
stance is based upon the famous dissent of Chief Justice Car-
dozo in the Graf case.' 54 There, a distinction was sharply drawn
between the acceleration for nonpayment of principal and inter-
est and acceleration for nonpayment of taxes. Acceleration for
failure to remit a mortgage payment was seen as the primary
obligation. It simply fixes the date of maturity as agreed upon
and is to be enforced as written. But the requirement to pay
taxes was held to stand on a different footing. Responsibility for
taxes does not require payment of anything to the mortgagee. 155
Rather, a provision for tax defaults is a collateral undertaking
designed to protect impairment of the mortgagee's security by
the accumulation of unpaid tax liens having priority over the
mortgage lien. Therefore, a court of equity has the power to
grant relief if the default is cured and the security is restored
149. Carlinde Realty Corp., 54 A.D.2d 574, 387 N.Y.S.2d 138 (failure to pay approx-
imately $15,000 in real estate taxes); Neubauer v. Smith, 40 A.D.2d 790, 337 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1st Dep't 1972) (failure to pay real estate taxes for all four quarters of year 1971);
Shaker Cent. Trust Fund, 26 Misc. 2d 825, 215 N.Y.S.2d 13 (failure to pay town, county
and school taxes for two years).
150. Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471 (acceleration of maturity date upheld
after timely notice was given); Armstrong, 139 Misc. 549, 247 N.Y.S. 682 (acceleration for
tax default upheld in case where the giving of proper and timely notice is established).
151. Smitty's Ranch, Inc., 122 A.D.2d 323, 504 N.Y.S.2d 295 (judgment of foreclo-
sure granted where record showed that "plaintiff notified defendants on at least three
occasions that nonpayment of taxes would result in foreclosure .... ); Cohan, 36 A.D.2d
743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 471 (acceleration of maturity date upheld after clear and unequivocal
warnings were given).
152. Fifty-Second St. Operating Corp., 236 A.D. 497, 260 N.Y.S. 28; Alley Springs
Apartments Corp., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 1980, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); Avon
Assocs., Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
153. Neubauer, 40 A.D.2d 790, 337 N.Y.S.2d 592; Shaker Cent. Trust Fund, 26
Misc. 2d 825, 215 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1960).
154. 254 N.Y. 1, 7, 171 N.E. 884, 886 (1930) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). The majority
decision took the same view but it is Justice Cardozo's dissent which is cited for the
principle.
155. This presupposes, obviously, that the mortgagee is not escrowing for taxes
whereby the payments would be made directly to the mortgagee.
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unimpaired.15
In this regard Justice Cardozo stated the following:
We have held that such a provision, though not a penalty in a
strict or proper sense, is yet so closely akin thereto in view of the
forfeiture of credit that equity will relieve against it if default has
been due to mere venial inattention and if relief can be granted
without damage to the lender .... 5'
Justice Cardozo was arguing vainly against the strict major-
ity view, and yet his language became in great measure the basis
to deny acceleration for tax defaults (although there were prior
holdings of similar thrust) - even though the principle creates
terms and conditions which simply do not appear in the lan-
guage of the mortgage contract.
The fact patterns in these cases and the decisions rendered
which deny foreclosure demonstrate extraordinary leniency by
the courts. 158
In analyzing the cases ruling against foreclosure for tax de-
faults, a recapitulation of the oft-cited principles include: some
waiver for forbearance by the mortgagee, in other words, the
mortgagee demonstrated that even it did not take the default
too seriously;15 9 principal and interest were otherwise current;160
failure to pay taxes was not willful, but was excusable as due to
venial inattention or error; 6 ' notice was not given, or if given,
was not unequivocal; 112 if notice was given, no opportunity to
156. A careful distinction must be drawn here. When a grace period for paying prin-
cipal and interest expires, and acceleration ensues, a tender of arrears need not be ac-
cepted, even though a full tender would cure the default. Where default in taxes is the
issue, cure of default subsequent to acceleration will be sanctioned in a majority of the
cases, although not in all instances. None of this is to say that acceleration for tax de-
faults is ineffectual, only that the courts will often allow a cure and thereby mandate
reinstatement.
157. Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 9-10, 171 N.E. 884, 887 (1930) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting).
158. See cases cited supra note 148. See also supra note 142.
159. Seaman's Bank for Sav. v. Wallenstein Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1938).
160. York v. Hucko, 14 Misc. 201, 262 N.Y.S. 62 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1933).
161. Noyes, 124 N.Y. at 182-83, 26 N.E. at 318. See also Weber v. Berkowitz,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1970, at 20, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970); Lincoln Say. Bank v.
Six Moffat Realty Co., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1970, at 15, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. Kings County).
162. Calta v. Belkin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1971, at 2, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1971); Lincoln Say. Bank v. Six Moffat Realty Co., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1970, at 15, col. 8
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cure was provided;163 there is no damage or prejudice to the
mortgagee;'" and the mortgagor has tendered the arrears for
taxes, or has legitimately attempted to, even after foreclosure
has begun.16 5
On the subject of the current status of the Graf doctrine, a
salient point emerges from examination of the tax default cases.
While relevant, the Graf approach never had pervasive applica-
tion to this type of default. Therefore, when dicta appears in a
tax default case suggesting that the influence of Graf is waning,
it is an incursion on a nonexistent principle and is clearly
misplaced.'66
B. Failure to Repair
This is another arena of some uncertainty and one where
Graf was never especially important. The traditional stance is
found in Mills Land Corp. v. Halstead.17 There, the mortgagee
declared the full principal balance due because the building was
not maintained in reasonably good repair. The mortgagor con-
tended that the maintenance clause failed to specifically author-
ize foreclosure for such violation. Ruling that foreclosure could
be based upon the " 'nonperformance of any act' required by the
mortgage,"'' 8 the holding went on to say that foreclosure could
"rest upon violation of a 'covenant to repair the premises.' "169
Whether the foregoing is genuinely a precedent is difficult
to assess. Caspert v. Anderson Apartments17 is a later case in-
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970); Norbant Realty Corp. v. A.C. Oaks, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 215
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1952).
163. Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 124 A.D. 814, 109 N.Y.S. 435 (1st Dep't 1908).
164. Norbant Realty Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17. See also Bank, N:Y.L.J.,
March 25, 1970, at 15, col. 8; Clark-Robinson Corp. v. Jet Enter., 159 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1957).
165. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1982); Germa-
nia Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 124 A.D. 814, 109 N.Y.S. 435 (1st Dep't 1980); Ver Plank v.
Godfrey, 42 A.D. 16, 58 N.Y.S. 784 (1st Dep't 1899); Calta v. Belkin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27,
1971, at 2, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Clark-Robinson Corp. v. Jet Enter., 159
N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1957); Norbant Realty Corp. v. A.C. Oaks, Inc.,
116 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1952).
166. See infra notes 252-325 and accompanying text.
167. 184 Misc. 679, 56 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1945).
168. Id. at 681, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 684 (quoting 41 C.J. Mortgages §. 1048 (1926)).
169. Id. (quoting C. WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES 74 (4th ed. 1927)).
170. 196 Misc. 555, 94 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
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volving the related topic of building violations which seems tac-
itly to accept the concept that foreclosure for lack of repair is
authorized, so long as the acceleration is timely made.17' But
there, the mortgagee waited so long to accelerate that the rare
defense of laches was invoked.172 During the period of delay up
to acceleration, the property was sold and the new owner in-
vested substantial sums in curing the violations. For this reason,
the decision appears well-founded and, therefore, not perforce
contrary to the general rule with regard to repair of building
violations.
In Rockaway Park Series Corp. v. Hollis Automotive
Corp., ' 7 a somewhat murky case, the mortgagee sold a building
subject to known violations relating to lack of repair. For sev-
eral years the mortgagee refrained from demanding that repairs
be made and continued to accept mortgage payments. Many
years later, when the mortgagee's inspection of the premises dis-
closed apparent unsatisfactory progress to cure the violations, an
acceleration letter was sent. After acceleration - but before
service of the summons and complaint - the violation was re-
moved. Without acknowledging that the lack of repair could be a
basis to foreclose, and sensing an injustice, the court relied upon
equity to deny foreclosure. 75 Since foreclosure is an action in
equity17 and since this was not a default in payment, the deci-
sion is not necessarily at variance with recognized principles.
A different concept grafted on to the requirements of the
usual failure to repair clause is found in W.I.M. Corp. v.
Cipulo, 77 where the mechanical aspect was a motion to dismiss
a receiver. For a building worth in excess of three million dol-
lars, foreclosure was instituted based solely upon failure to keep
the premises in reasonably good repair. The court noted a pau-
city of evidence to explain the magnitude of the disrepair, con-
cluding that the repair default was minor and of the type engen-
171. Id. at 559, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
172. Id. at 560, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
173. 206 Misc. 955, 135 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
174. Id. at 956, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
175. Id. at 956-58, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 589-90.
176. See infra notes 246-251 and accompanying text.
177. 216 A.D. 46, 214 N.Y.S. 718 (1st Dep't 1926).
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dered by normal wear and tear."8 Instead of finding the state of
repair reasonable, and thus not violative of the mortgage, the
court held that the repair clause could be invoked only where
there is a danger of impairment of the mortgage security.1 9
Therefore, this case held, it is only where the property is permit-
ted to suffer lack of repair sufficient to jeopardize the security
when acceleration will be honored.180
There should be no doubt that failure to keep the mort-
gaged premises in reasonably good repair is a basis to accelerate,
although the case law is not as strong on the point as mortgagees
would probably prefer. What "reasonably good repair" means
could always be expected to be an issue of fact. Whether the
definition is now graven in stone as "danger to the security" is
unclear - but possible. The conundrum then is what level of
lack of repair places the security in jeopardy? The case from
which it arose was more a function of whether a receiver should
be appointed, combined with inadequacy of proof of the defi-
cient conditions claimed by the mortgagee. This calls the solid-
ity of this doctrine into question. Moreover, and significantly, it
does not represent an assault upon Graf.
At least insofar as property improved by a residence for four
families or more is concerned, some very limited guidance is
found in a section of the Real Property Law effective as of Octo-
ber 10, 1984.181 It construes the covenant stating "good condition
or repair" to mean "free from violations of applicable municipal
or state laws, codes or regulations concerning the state of such
condition and/or repair."' 82
This provision now also has a statutory impact upon accel-
eration by virtue of this language:
Upon a finding and certification by any such government or its
agency of a violation of any such law, code or regulation involving
a serious danger to the health and safety of the occupants of such
mortgaged premises and upon the service of one copy thereof on
the owner of record such mortgagee may declare the entire bal-
ance of the principal sum secured by such mortgage, together
178. Id. at 50-51, 214 N.Y.S. at 722-23.
179. Id. at 49, 214 N.Y.S. at 721.
180. Id.
181. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254 subd. 4-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
182. Id. § 254 subd. 4-a(a).
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with all accrued interest, immediately due and payable upon the
following conditions: the mortgagee shall allow the mortgagor a
reasonable opportunity to correct the violation and may com-
mence foreclosure proceedings upon failure of the mortgagor to
make such corrections within the time period mandated by local
law, rule or code enforcement agency, however, no such action
shall be commenced within thirty days of the expiration of the
period, if any, specified by local law, rule or code enforcement
regulation.188
Its further effect upon acceleration arises from a provision
that if a foreclosure is commenced for such violation, but not
completed because the violation is cured, the mortgagee shall be
entitled to recover all reasonable attorney's fees and disburse-
ments incurred in bringing the action.'M
Again we have a somewhat unsettled arena, but not a place
where Graf is in question.
C. Miscellaneous Defaults
Mindful that acceleration clauses will usually authorize
foreclosure for a broad range of defaults, in addition to the more
common failure to pay and the others previously evaluated,
cases involving violations less frequently encountered merit con-
sideration, noted here under the catchall "miscellaneous." Sig-
nificantly, this is still another realm where Graf has never been
of overriding importance.
Beyond the categories already reviewed, other defaults are
seen as more technical and less prejudicial in nature to the
mortgagee's position. Accordingly, the courts feel free to fashion
equitable or practical remedies - often short of sanctioning ac-
celeration. This is not to say that these more obscure breaches
cannot be a basis to accelerate, but rather that acceleration is
occasionally denied.
For example, where refusal to issue an estoppel certificate
was the default, the court acknowledged that under certain cir-
cumstances, declining to execute the estoppel is a default. 5 In
183. Id.
184. Id. § 254 subd. 4-a(b).
185. Northern Properties Inc. v. Kuf Realty Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 1, 5, 217 N.Y.S.2d
355, 360 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1961) (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254 subd. 7
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this case, the refusal was not unconditional, and foreclosure for
this default (others were alleged) was disallowed.186
In another instance where failure to execute an estoppel cer-
tificate was one of the claimed defaults, the court found a ques-
tion of fact as to possible waiver, noting in addition that the
Graf doctrine need not apply for a default of this type. 187
In a case where acceleration was based, in part, upon re-
moval of personalty, the court relied upon equity to deny fore-
closure, holding that removal of old fixtures and personalty with
substitution of new fixtures and personalty under conditional
sales contracts would not justify acceleration where the condi-
tional sales contracts were ultimately satisfied. 8
Where the asserted breach was alteration without consent,
the mortgagor's violation consisted of cutting a door and window
in a foundation wall, erection of wooden partitions in the base-
ment, removal of two foundation piers, with substitutions then
made, a window made into a door, a stairway removed, and con-
struction of an uncovered wooden porch. 89 Upon discovering the
unauthorized alterations, the mortgagee accelerated. 190 Finding
that the work did not change the character of the property, the
court ruled the acceleration to be "unconscionable."''
When the breach was demolition without consent, the mort-
gagee's claim failed because of an error in drafting the mort-
gage. 19 2 The mortgage contained a clause that no building on the
premises could be removed or demolished without consent of the
mortgagee. In violation of the covenant, the four-room house on
the property was demolished without consent. However, the ac-
celeration clause did not cover such an event. Although the
court stated that the mortgagee could sue for breach of contract,
it could not accelerate or foreclose.' 93
(McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1988)).
186. Id. at 5, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
187. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1982).
188. Blomgren v. Tinton 763 Corp., 33 Misc. 2d 1057, 235 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1962).
189. Loughery v. Catalano, 117 Misc. 393, 395, 191 N.Y.S. 436, 437 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1921).
190. Id. at 395, 191 N.Y.S. at 437-38.
191. Id. at 397-98, 191 N.Y.S. at 438-39.
192. Brayton v. Pappas, 52 A.D.2d 187, 383 N.Y.S.2d 723 (4th Dep't 1976).
193. Id. at 189, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 725. Compare Laber v. Minassian, 134 Misc. 2d 543,
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Upon demolition of mortgaged premises pursuant to munic-
ipal order to cure a safety hazard, the acceleration clause was
interpreted not to authorize foreclosure under the cir-
cumstances. 94
With regard to failure to insure the mortgaged premises,
notwithstanding claims of misrepresentations in the contract of
sale, where due notice was given and insurance was not ob-
tained, acceleration and foreclosure were upheld.195 But when a
mortgagee demanded insurance beyond the requirements of the
mortgage, foreclosure would not be countenanced. 96 On the re-
lated subject of displaying receipts for insurance payments, a
court invoked equity to avoid acceleration where there was a
question about waiver arising from a custom established be-
tween the parties. 9 7
Thus, in the domain of miscellany, enforcement of the ac-
celeration clause is uncertain and unsettled. Since fact patterns
undoubtedly will always influence the outcome, it is unlikely
that clarity here will ever be forthcoming. But Graf is still not a
factor.
VII. Avoiding the Graf Doctrine
As pronounced in Graf and its progeny, the mortgagor is
bound by the terms of his contract as made and cannot be re-
lieved from default "in the absence of waiver by the mortgagee,
or estoppel, or bad faith, fraud, oppressive or unconscionable
conduct ... ."198
Even for failure to pay principal and interest, the cited
moderating factors are to be considered. Significantly though,
Graf states that it is not oppressive or unconscionable to accel-
erate immediately after expiration of the grace period. But that
511 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1987) (properly worded clause held to support acceleration for demoli-
tion without consent).
194. Bodwitch v. Allen, 91 A.D.2d 1177, 459 N.Y.S.2d 148 (4th Dep't 1983).
195. Jordon v. Sharpe, 92 A.D.2d 946, 460 N.Y.S.2d 846 (3d Dep't 1983), appeal
denied, 59 N.Y.2d 968 (1983).
196. Bieber v. Goldberg, 133 A.D. 207, 210, 117 N.Y.S. 211, 213-14 (2d Dep't 1909).
197. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 812-13, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281-82 (3d
Dep't 1982).
198. Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 436
N.E.2d 1265, 1269, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663, 667 (1982). See also supra notes 92-108.
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still leaves the other items. Fraud, for example, is at once both
clear and recondite. It belabors the obvious to recite that if the
lender committed a fraud, he certainly should not be permitted
to foreclose. Precisely what would be considered a fraud is so
bound to factual circumstances as not to be worthy of salutary
exploration here.199
The idea of bad faith has not found much favor, except as a
factor lumped together with the other principles. Oppressive
conduct is invariably joined to a finding of unconscionability.
Estoppel is the subject of some decisions, although difficult to
separate from waiver.
When courts encounter a fact pattern deemed offensive,
that is, if it somehow seems fair to reject acceleration, some
combination of estoppel, bad faith, oppressive or unconscionable
conduct 00 may be found. These, in turn, are tied to invocation
of equity as a basis to deny foreclosure. Thus, the tenets of Graf
are sometimes avoided in the perceived presence of some or all
of these factors.20'
Waiver is appreciably different. When the courts glean a ba-
sis for waiver, they essentially recognize the efficacy of Graf, or
should do so, but then render it ineffectual because of conduct
giving rise to a waiver of the right to accelerate.
A. Waiver
With the firm advent of waiver as a basis to vitiate accelera-
tion,0 2 substantial latitude was given to judges to craft decisions
sounding in waiver while in actuality achieving an apparent eq-
uitable result. In essence, some conduct by the mortgagee, either
199. There is a general proposition that a fraud perpetrated by a lender at the in-
ception will be a defense. Crowe v. Malba Land Co., 76 Misc. 676, 679, 135 N.Y.S. 454,
456 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1912). However, the fraud may render the mortgage only
voidable as opposed to void. Samuels v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Misc. 2d
202, 203, 231 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962). But note the seemingly
converse proposition that "a mortgage may not be set aside solely because the underlying
transaction was tainted by a fraudulent representation." JoAnn Homes at Bellmore, Inc.
v. Dworetz, 25 N.Y.2d 112, 122, 250 N.E.2d 214, 219, 302 N.Y.S.2d 799, 806 (1969). See
also New York State Hous. Fin. Agency v. Promenade Apartments, Inc., N.Y.L.J., June
21, 1979, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
200. See infra notes 201-245 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
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prior or subsequent to acceleration, which is inconsistent with
demand for payment of the full principal, can lead to a waiver of
acceleration.20 Nevertheless, claims of waiver are frequently
rejected.204
Situations where waiver was adopted as a valid defense to
foreclosure include the following. In the New York Supreme
Court case of Scheible v. Leinen,20 5 the mortgagee had previ-
ously accepted but one payment after the grace period. This was
found to create an "issue of waiver" concerning a future right to
accelerate. 20 6 A careful reading of the case, though, indicates
that the court believed the mortgagee to be motivated more by a
desire to extinguish a low interest rate mortgage and free the
funds to invest at a higher yield. 20 1 Even were this accurate, it
incorrectly views the law on acceleration, which is that default in
203. See Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prod. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 186,
436 N.E.2d 1265, 1270, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663, 668 (1982); Lopez v. Highmount Ass'n, 101
A.D.2d 618, 619, 474 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (3d Dep't 1984); DiBart v. Erhal Holding Corp.,
60 A.D.2d 879, 879, 401 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (2d Dep't 1978); More Realty Corp. v.
Mootchnick, 232 A.D. 705, 705, 247 N.Y.S. 712, 713 (2d Dep't 1931); Federal Nat'l Mort-
gage Ass'n v. Miller, 123 Misc. 2d 431, 432, 473 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744-45 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1984); Scheible v. Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 459, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1971); Scelza v. Ryba, 10 Misc. 2d 186, 188, 169 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1957); Dale Holding Corp. v. Dale Gardens, Inc., 186 Misc. 940, 944,
59 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945); Battim Assocs. v. L & L Estates,
Inc., 186 Misc. 141, 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945); French v.
Row, 77 Hun 380, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1894).
204. See Marine Midland Bank v. Village Latch, Inc., 123 A.D.2d 605, 506 N.Y.S.2d
887 (2d Dep't 1986); Barclay's Bank v. Smitty's Ranch, Inc., 122 A.D.2d 323, 504
N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep't 1986); Southold Say. Bank v. Cutino, 118 A.D.2d 555, 499
N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1986); Marine Midland Bank v. Northeast Kawasaki, Inc., 92
A.D.2d 952, 460 N.Y.S.2d 666 (3d Dep't 1983); Federal Land Bank v. Azapian, 98 A.D.2d
760, 469 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1983); Mariash v. Bastianich, 88 A.D.2d 829, 452
N.Y.S.2d 190 (1st Dep't 1982); Chemical Bank v. Econ, 87 A.D.2d 706, 448 N.Y.S.2d 898
(3d Dep't 1982), appeal denied, 58 N.Y.2d 821, 445 N.E.2d 652, 459 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1983);
Hudson City Say. Inst. v. Burton, 88 A.D.2d 728, 451 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1982);
Dime Say. Bank v. Dooley, 84 A.D.2d 804, 444 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1981); Bowers v.
Zaimes, 59 A.D.2d 803, 398 N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1977); Jamaica Say. Bank v. Avon
Assocs., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Shell Oil Co. v. Mc-
Graw, 48 A.D.2d 220, 368 N.Y.S.2d 610 (4th Dep't 1975); Ford v. Waxman, 50 A.D.2d
585, 375 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d Dep't 1975); Bolmer Bros. v. Bolmer Constr. Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d
530 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952); Armstrong v. Rogdon Holding Corp., 139 Misc. 549,
247 N.Y.S. 682 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930).
205. 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971) (citing
French v. Row, 77 Hun 380, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1894)).
206. Id. at 459, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
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timely paying principal and interest will precipitate the option
to accelerate, with sympathy and other extraneous matters rele-
gated to irrelevancy.2 08 Although perhaps not intended as a di-
rect attack on Graf, this case sought to avoid the doctrine by
finding that the fact pattern created an issue of waiver.2 0 9 The
principle remains, however, effectively unassailed by this case.
In a somewhat similar case, the mortgagor's payment was
concededly submitted fourteen days after expiration of the grace
period.21 0 That was the fifth consecutive time of late submission.
Mortgagee presented the installment to the bank to be cashed,
but was informed that there were insufficient funds available.
He tried to cash it again the next day when it was likewise re-
jected. A few days later, mortgagee's attorney accelerated the
mortgage based upon this latest check having been returned by
the bank, and incidentally noted the prior late submissions. (It
was later learned that mortgagee's bank had made an error and
should have honored the check.) One of the gratuitous rulings of
the court was that a course of conduct was established by acqui-
escence on the part of the mortgagee in accepting late pay-
ments.2 1' Later in the decision, the court, in denying foreclosure,
found the mortgagor's default to be neither willful nor in bad
faith and due solely to the bank's error. Foreclosure was there-
fore found to be inequitable.2 2 While the latter language seems
to show the true reasoning, the decision still contains that lan-
guage about waiver.2 13
In another case, acceleration was attempted for failure to
pay during the last day of the grace period. 14 Therefore, at the
time of acceleration, no default existed. On that basis, consistent
with the law, the court ruled against foreclosure.2 15 But the court
also noted that a custom had developed between the parties for
monthly payments to be transmitted by mail. Mortgagor sent
208. Graf, 254 N.Y. at 4, 171 N.E. at 885. See also supra cases cited in notes 92-108.
209. Scheible, 67 Misc. 2d at 459, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
210. Scelza, 10 Misc. 2d at 186, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
211. Id. at 187, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
212. Id. at 188, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
213. Id.
214. Dale Holding Corp. v. Dale Gardens, Inc., 186 Misc. 940, 941, 59 N.Y.S.2d 210,
212 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945).
215. Id. at 94, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
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the check, but made the check payable to the wrong party. By
the time mortgagee mailed the check back, mortgagor was in de-
fault. Those facts, the court held, would be enough to find a
waiver."'
The cited rulings, however, must be contrasted with other
cases supporting a different posture. For example, where a
tender was received after both the grace period and acceleration,
retained for five days and then returned, no waiver was found.21 7
Where claim has been made that prior payments had been
untimely submitted so as to constitute a waiver of the right to
insist upon timely payments, courts have ruled that the record
would have to establish knowledgeable acceptance of late pay-
ments over an extended period.2 18 Moreover, where mortgagor
maintained that mortgagee's previous acceptance of late pay-
ments raised a triable issue as to whether mortgagor was led to
believe such payments would always be accepted, the court
found nothing in pleadings or affidavits suggesting that the
mortgagor was misled into believing that mortgagee was waiving
its right to accelerate.219
Even where a mortgagee's conduct did lead mortgagor "to
believe strict compliance with the terms of the mortgage was not
required,... failure to tender the entire amount then due after
learning of [mortgagee's] intent to insist on strict compliance
neutralize[s] the defense [of waiver, thus supporting accelera-
tion]. .. ."220
In addition, there are any number of other principles relied
on by the courts in rejecting the defense of waiver. Where a de-
faulting mortgagor alleged waiver, claiming that the mortgagee's
vice president told him mortgage payments could be delayed,
216. Id. at 942-44, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 212-16.
217. Bolmer Bros. v. Bolmer Constr. Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d at 536 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1952).
218. For cases where waivers were not found, see Bowers v. Zaimes, 59 A.D.2d 803,
398 N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1977); Ford v. Waxman, 50 A.D.2d 585, 375 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d
Dep't 1975).
219. Dooley, 84 A.D.2d at 805, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
220. Burton, 88 A.D.2d at 729, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Accord Jamaica Sav. Bank v.
Cohan, 36 A.D.2d 743, 320 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (2d Dep't 1971); Village Latch, Inc., 123
A.D.2d at 606, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 888; Smitty's Ranch, Inc., 122 A.D.2d at 324-25, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 297; Cutino, 118 A.D.2d at 556, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
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the contention was rejected for two reasons.221 First, even as-
suming the statement was made, there was no consideration to
the mortgagee to support the alleged waiver and therefore none
could exist.22s Second, to claim estoppel - closely related to
waiver - the mortgagor would have to produce evidentiary
proof in admissible form with more than" 'mere conclusions, ex-
pressions of hope, unsubstantiated allegations or assertions' ""3
in order to defeat mortgagee's motion for summary judgment.22
Of like significance is the concept that a claim of waiver cannot
be supported by conclusory and contradictory data.225
Where the claim is oral waiver by way of oral modification
of the mortgage, there is authority that some writing showing
this modification sufficient to contradict the mortgagee's records
is required. Failing to produce that, or some compelling reason
why some writing cannot be produced, will defeat the waiver
claim. 226 However, this must be compared with other cases on
point, to the effect that an alleged oral waiver by the mortgagee
of its right to accelerate the principal and interest represents a
valid affirmative defense to foreclosure.2 2 In both these cases,
the claim of oral waiver was believed by the courts. In one, an
officer of the mortgagor submitted an affidavit detailing at con-
siderable length his discussions with mortgagee's officer which
was claimed to constitute a waiver.228 No affidavit in opposition
of the bank's officer was submitted, leading to the inference that
the oral waiver did exist.
In the related area of defaults for failure to pay taxes, when
taxes were unpaid by the mortgagor, it was held not to be a
waiver of acceleration for tax defaults to accept a monthly mort-
221. Chemical Bank v. Econ, 87 A.D.2d 706, 448 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2d Dep't 1982).
222. Id. at 707, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
223. Id. at 706, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting State Bank v. Fioravanti, 51 N.Y.2d
638, 417 N.E.2d 60, 435 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980)).
224. Id. at 706, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 898. See also Flintkote Co. v. Bert Bar Holding
Corp., 114 A.D.2d 400, 494 N.Y.S.2d 43 (2d Dep't 1985).
225. Federal Land Bank v. Azapian, 98 A.D.2d 760, 760, 469 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (2d
Dep't 1983) (citing Northeast Small Business Inv. Corp. v. Waccabuc Investors, 90
A.D.2d 538, 455 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d Dep't 1982)).
226. Northeast Kawasaki, Inc., 92 A.D.2d at 953, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 668 (citing Zuck-
erman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1980)).
227. See Nassau Trust Co., 56 N.Y.2d at 186, 436 N.E.2d at 1271, 451 N.Y.S.2d at
669.
228. Nassau Trust Co., 56 N.Y.2d at 180, 436 N.E.2d at 1267, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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gage installment.229 To constitute a waiver, it must be shown
that the mortgagors knew and relied upon the acts alleged to
indicate a waiver and as a consequence defaulted in their
obligation.3
Still, there are further cases which have adopted waiver. For
example, acceptance of a postdated check was held to be a
waiver to accelerate for the payment represented by that check,
even though funds were not currently on deposit." 1
Retaining mortgage installments, even if tendered late, can
defeat an attempt to accelerate later.2 12 In one case, " 3 a mort-
gage payment due on August 1 was missed. Upon discovering
the error, mortgagor mailed the payment on August 31 together
with the succeeding installment due for September 1. Ten days
later, on September 10, plaintiff began the foreclosure. While
the mere fact that tender prior to acceleration could readily
have been the ruling, the court assumed a different perspective
and based its denial of the foreclosure on waiver, finding that
"the retention of [the] checks ought be as significant and effec-
tive as the retention of any paper in a lawsuit that is served too
late but is not returned." 4
If a mortgagee promises to forbear, even if that promise is
gratuitous, there is authority that if this leads the mortgagor to
believe he can pay in a different manner and he relies upon it,
the mortgagee must give reasonable notice of his revocation of
that promise relied upon or there is a waiver.2 " Where there is
consideration for some new promise, then in essence there is a
new contract and the issue of the Statute of Frauds is no longer
229. Armstrong, 139 Misc. at 551, 247 N.Y.S. at 684.
230. Jamaica Say. Bank v. Avon Assocs., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County).
231. See Central Nat'l Bank v. Paton, 109 Misc. 2d 42, 45, 439 N.Y.S.2d 619, 622
(Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1981).
232. Lopez, 101 A.D.2d at 619, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (citing Sherwood v. Greene, 41
A.D.2d 881, 882, 342 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (3d Dep't 1973)). See Battim Assocs., 186 Misc.
at 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 97. See also DiBart, 60 A.D.2d at 879-80, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 279.
233. Battim Assocs. v. Lil Estates, Inc., 186 Misc. 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1945).
234. Id. at 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
235. See Rosenthal v. Brown, 247 N.Y. 479, 160 N.E. 921 (1928); Seamen's Bank for
Sav. v. Wallenstein Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938). See also
Nassau Trust Co., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 436 N.E.2d 1265, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663.
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involved."'
B. Estoppel
Estoppel as a basis to deny acceleration is closely akin to
waiver and difficult to separate from that previously mentioned
concept. If there is a waiver, courts concurrently conclude, the
mortgagee should be estopped from proceeding.3 7
Although it is an arduous exercise to treat estoppel as a sep-
arate topic, some guidelines have been established. For a mort-
gagee to be equitably estopped, the mortgagor "'must establish:
(1) [c]onduct which amounts to a false representation or con-
cealment of material facts . . .(2) intention, or at least expecta-
tion, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party;
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.' "238 Con-
cerning the mortgagor's perspective on estoppel, the essential el-
ements include lack of knowledge, reliance upon the conduct of
the party estopped, and action based thereon whereby position
is prejudicially changed.239
The following represent typical situations where estoppel
can intercept foreclosure. Estoppel was found to be a question of
fact sufficient to deny summary judgment where a mortgagor's
prior defaults in providing receipts for paid taxes was never the
subject of complaint.24 0 Moreover where mortgagee led mortga-
gor to believe that there was still time to make payments accord-
ing to an arrangement entered into after acceleration was no-
ticed and foreclosure was instituted, the mortgagee was estopped
236. Winker v. Robinson, 36 Misc. 2d 804, 807, 233 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985 (Sup. Ct.
Niagara County 1962). See also Brown v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 117 N.Y. 266, 274,
22 N.E. 952, 954 (1889); Dodge v. Crandall, 30 N.Y. 294, 307-08 (1864).
237. See supra notes 202-236. Estoppel may also be linked with a finding of oppres-
sive or unconscionable conduct.
238. Gratton v. Dido Realty Co., 89 Misc. 2d 401, 402-03, 391 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 959, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (2d Dep't 1978)
(quoting New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Noyes, 260 A.D. 240, 248, 22
N.Y.S.2d 132, 140 (3d Dep't), modified, 284 N.Y. 197, 30 N.E.2d 471 (1940)). Cf. Triple
Cities Constr. Co. v. Maryland Gas Co., 4 N.Y.2d 443, 448, 151 N.E.2d 856, 858, 176
N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (1958).
239. Gratton, 89 Misc. 2d at 403, 391 N.Y.S. at 955.
240. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 813, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (3d Dep't
1982).
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from proceeding.2 41
A more detailed set of facts supporting estoppel is as fol-
lows. Based upon default in paying interest, mortgagee insti-
tuted foreclosure. During the following year, a settlement was
reached giving mortgagor three to five years to liquidate the
mortgaged premises to satisfy the obligation. Certain payments
were to be made during that period. Mortgagee had the right to
reasonably approve all sales and to continue the foreclosure
upon mortgagor's default, so long as notice of default was given,
in which event mortgagor could give a deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure. An interest payment came due under the stipulation of set-
tlement and was not paid. Mortgagor swore - and was not con-
troverted - that he advised mortgagee's officer of his inability
to make that payment and he offered the deed. He was told,
however, that the mortgagee preferred a sale and he was urged
to continue his efforts to sell. When subsequently the mortgagor
submitted a contract of sale, mortgagee rejected it, claiming the
mortgagor was in default. The court found issues of fact suffi-
cient to require a trial on the issue of estoppel. " 2
Of like effect was a court's finding that a question of fact
existed as to whether mortgagee by its conduct induced mortga-
gor to believe additional time was available beyond an agreed
due date to obtain alternate financing. Further, there existed a
question of fact as to whether such belief was reasonable and
acted upon to the prejudice of the mortgagor, thereby creating
an estoppel.24 s
But a mortgagor carries a heavy burden to demonstrate es-
toppel, 4" which militates against it being commonly em-
241. Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 185, 436
N.E.2d 1265, 1270, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663, 668 (1982).
242. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Cottrell, 71 A.D.2d 538, 540-42, 422
N.Y.S.2d 990, 991-92 (4th Dep't 1979).
243. See Marine Midland Bank-W. v. Center of Williamsville, 48 A.D.2d 764, 368
N.Y.S.2d 91 (4th Dep't 1975).
244. Some of the standards are found in Chemical Bank v. Econ, 87 A.D.2d 706, 706,
448 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (3d Dep't 1982) (evidentiary proof in admissible forms sufficient
to require a trial); Northeast Small Business Inv. Corp. v. Waccabuc Investors Inc., 90
A.D.2d 538, 539, 455 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (2d Dep't 1982) (beyond conclusory allegations).
For cases where mortgagor has not met his burden of demonstrating existence of an issue
of fact as to the existence of estoppel, see Barclay's Bank v. Smitty's Ranch, Inc., 122
A.D.2d 323, 504 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep't 1986); Federal Land Bank v. Azapian, 98 A.D.2d
760, 469 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1983); Gratton v. Dido Realty Corp., 89 Misc. 2d 401,
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ployed.245 In any event, while estoppel is a basis to avoid what
would otherwise eventuate from the Graf doctrine, conceptually
it is not at variance with Graf.
C. Equity and the Assault on Precedent
It has long been the settled law in New York that mortgage
foreclosure is an equitable action2 46 and there are a multitude of
decisions standing for that proposition for a broad range of de-
faults.24 7 Among the many ways the concept is phrased include:
391 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977).
245. For example, adjourning a foreclosure sale to permit the mortgagor to arrange
new financing is not sufficient for estoppel. National Bank of N. Am. v. Cohen, 89 A.D.2d
725, 726, 453 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (3d Dep't 1982).
246. Closely associated with equity is the concept of unconscionability. While un-
controverted that unconscionability is a defense to acceleration, it is almost impossible to
separate it from a pronouncement of "equity." Moreover, predicting the circumstances
under which a court will employ, semantically, the unconscionability formulation is not
readily ascertainable. Some examples where unconscionability was considered are as
follows:
In Northern Properties, Inc. v. Kuf Realty Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 1, 217 N.Y.S.2d 355
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1961), acceleration by the assignee of the original mort-
gage was upheld as not unconscionable where mortgagor mailed mortgage payments to
the original mortgagee instead of the assignee. In Loughery v. Catalano, 117 Misc. 393,
191 N.Y.S. 436 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1921), afj'd, 207 A.D. 895 (1st Dep't 1923), un-
conscionability was a basis to reject acceleration where alterations to the property were
deemed not to jeopardize the security. Although there are decisions to the contrary (not
necessarily involving unconscionability), the court in DiMatteo v. North Tonawanda
Auto Wash, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 692, 476 N.Y.S.2d 40 (4th Dep't 1984), held that an issue of
fact existed regarding the unconscionability of mortgagee's conduct. The mortgagee ac-
celerated the debt for a mortgage payment drawn on insufficient funds when the check
would have been good had the mortgagee submitted it for collection earlier or later than
it did. Other cases invoking unconscionability include: Fairmont Assocs. v. Fairmont Es-
tates, 99 A.D.2d 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1984); Fort William Henry Corp. v.
Lake George Inn, Inc., 27 A.D.2d 884, 277 N.Y.S.2d 782 (3d Dep't 1967); Miller v.
Kotzen, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1983); Scheible v.
Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971); Blomgren v.
Tinton, 33 Misc. 2d 1057, 225 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962), modified, 18
A.D.2d 979, 238 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dep't 1963); Josephson v. Caral Real Estate Co., 200
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960); Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co., 179
Misc. 749, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943), aff'd, 266 A.D. 725, 41 N.Y.S.2d
940 (1st Dep't 1943). See infra notes 273-323 and accompanying text. See also Towne
Funding Co, v. Macchia, 120 A.D.2d 519, 501 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1986) (discussion of
the standard of unconscionability in Connecticut mortgage law).
247. See Notey v. Darien Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 1005, 364 N.E.2d 883, 396
N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977); Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 316 (1891); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Avalon Orchards, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 297, 505 N.Y.S.2d 216 (3d Dep't 1986);
DiMatteo v. North Tonawonda Auto Wash, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 692, 476 N.Y.S.2d 40 (4th
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/1
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an action to foreclose a mortgage is "equitable in nature and
triggers the equitable powers of the court;" 4 ' "equity will not be
exercised when its exercise would result in an injustice or op-
pression;"2" 9 mortgage foreclosure is subject to the "cardinal
principle of equity jurisprudence that he who seeks equity must
do equity;"2' 50 and equity can require any party to show that it
has dealt fairly before giving relief. 5'
But there is no reason why the well recognized equity prin-
ciples cannot coexist with Graf. Yet, equity is almost invariably
the rubric invoked when a court seeks a result to avoid the ac-
tual or perceived thrust of the Graf case. It is important at this
juncture to emphasize the essence of Graf, which is that the
Dep't 1984); Karas, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280; T.J. Bettes Co. v. South Falls
Corp., 28 A.D.2d 198, 284 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dep't 1967); Nove Holding Corp. v.
Schechter, 218 A.D. 479, 218 N.Y.S. 623 (1st Dep't 1926); Trowbridge v. Malex Realty
Corp., 198 A.D. 656, 191 N.Y.S. 97 (1st Dep't 1921); Bieber v. Goldberg, 133 A.D. 207,
117 N.Y.S. 211 (2d Dep't 1909); Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 124 A.D. 814, 109
N.Y.S. 435 (1st Dep't 1908); Ver Planck v. Godfrey, 42 A.D. 16, 58 N.Y.S. 784 (1st Dep't
1899); Laber v. Minassian, 134 Misc. 2d 543, 511 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1987); Miller, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1983); New-
burgh Say. Bank v. Grossman, 118 Misc. 2d 1036, 462 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County 1982); Lincoln First Bank, N.A. v. Thayer, 102 Misc. 2d 451, 423 N.Y.S.2d 795
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1979); Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1978); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d
814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975); Scheible, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324
N.Y.S.2d 197; Griffo v. Swartz, 61 Misc. 2d 504, 306 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1969); Baldwin-Bellmore Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Stellato, 55 Misc. 2d 1043,
287 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968); Shapiro v. Housewares Super Mart,
Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 107, 250 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964); Blomgren, 33
Misc. 2d 1057, 225 N.Y.S.2d 347; Josephson, 200 N.Y.S.2d 1016; Karhan v. 1374 First
Ave. Realty Corp., No. 10571/82, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Nov. 3, 1982); 100 Eighth
Ave. Corp. v. Morgenstern, 3 Misc. 2d 410, 150 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1956), modified on other grounds, 4 A.D.2d 754, 164 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1957); Rock-
away Park Series Corp. v. Hollis Automotive Corp., 206 Misc. 955, 135 N.Y.S.2d 588
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); Caspert v. Anderson Apartments, Inc., 196 Misc. 555, 94
N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949); Battim Assocs., 186 Misc. 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d
96; Domus Realty Corp., 179 Misc. 749, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69; Home Owner's Loan Corp. v.
Wood, 164 Misc. 215, 298 N.Y.S. 427 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1937); Loughery, 117
Misc. 393, 191 N.Y.S. 436; French v. Row, 77 Hun 380, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
4th Dep't 1894).
248. Newburgh Say. Bank v. Grossman, 118 Misc. 2d 1036, 1039, 462 N.Y.S.2d 92,
93 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982).
249. Nichols, 92 Misc. 2d at 940, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
250. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d at 823, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
251. Griffo v. Swartz, 61 Misc. 2d 504, 515, 306 N.Y.S.2d 64, 76 (Monroe County
Court 1969).
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mortgage contract is sacred, at least insofar as default in paying
principal and interest is concerned. 52 To insist under such cir-
cumstances on strict enforcement of the agreement - and thus
the right to accelerate - was held not to be oppressive, uncon-
scionable or inequitable.253
Recall also that in Graf the default was not willful. Clearly
it was both inadvertent and sympathetic with the mortgagee's
response to swiftly avail itself of the acceleration clause.254 Rec-
ognizing these facts, it is difficult to beleaguer the Graf doctrine,
which after all, was a decision of the court of appeals.
Yet, Graf does come under attack in two ways. One mode of
assault is application and purported refutation of Graf for de-
faults other than principal and interest. While influential, Graf
was never the controlling force for these other varieties of
default.
Alternatively, some cases tackle Graf head on, either errone-
ously or by possibly creating a refinement of the doctrine. So,
the accepted equity principles that apply to foreclosure, and in
particular, acceleration, require far more analysis than merely
observing the role of equity.
Although the arrival of Graf in 1930 diminished somewhat
the importance of decisions prior to that time, since earlier cases
are still cited, mention of them is appropriate. Even among
these, however, most concern defaults for other than principal
and interest.
Where taxes were not paid by the mortgagor, equity granted
relief2 55 - which is consistent with the majority of cases even
subsequent to 1930.256 Also not surprising is the holding in
Loughery v. Catalano,25 where, in breach of the mortgage, alter-
ations to the mortgaged premises were made without consent.
Equity granted relief when it was shown that the security was
not impaired. In Trowbridge v. Malex Realty Corp.,5 ' where the
252. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 316 (1891); Germania Life Ins. Co. v.
Potter, 124 A.D. 814, 109 N.Y.S. 435 (1st Dep't 1908).
256. See supra notes 143-166 and accompanying text.
257. 117 Misc. 393, 191 N.Y.S. 436 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1921).
258. 198 A.D. 656, 191 N.Y.S. 97 (1st Dep't 1921).
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default was on a prior mortgage, equity found circumstances to
disallow foreclosure.
There are only three decisions prior to Graf where equity
was the stated basis providing relief for failure to pay principal
and interest. 59 In Nove Holding Corp. v. Schechter,26 0 a mort-
gage payment was due on November 1. Mortgagor averred that
it was mailed on that date although it was never received by the
mortgagee.26 1 Acceleration occurred on November 3, in response
to which mortgagor immediately offered to remit a certified
check and actually did so two days later."' Finding the default
merely technical and not willful, the court applied equity to void
the acceleration. 8 Whether the subsequent ruling in Graf
would have reached a contrary result is problematical because
the error causing payment default may not have been on mort-
gagor's part. Such was a question of fact. Finding the default
unintentional, as the court did, is less persuasive since the de-
fault in Graf was also unintentional, but nevertheless consti-
tuted a valid basis to accelerate.
Another case decided before 1930 was Bieber v. Goldberg,26'
where a timely tender of principal and interest was rejected by
mortgagee because it did not include an amount for insurance.
There was a question of both fact and law as to whether the
insurance was actually due. Accordingly, the court cited equity
to provide relief from the claimed default. 65 This holding does
not run counter to the later Graf case because here the default
itself could be gainsaid.
Finally, there is French v. Row, 2 6 where the court was of-
fended by mortgagee's motive for accelerating, finding that
mortgagee was actually trying to compel transfer of the property
to himself.2 6 7 Relying upon equity to afford relief from uncon-
259. Nove Holding Corp. v. Schecter, 218 A.D. 479, 218 N.Y.S. 623 (1st Dep't 1926);
Bieber v. Goldberg, 133 A.D. 207, 117 N.Y.S. 211 (2d Dep't 1909); French v. Row, 77
Hun 380, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1894).
260. 218 A.D. 479, 218 N.Y.S. 623 (1st Dep't 1926).
261. Id. at 482, 218 N.Y.S. at 625-26.
262. Id. at 483, 218 N.Y.S. at 626.
263. Id. at 487-88, 218 N.Y.S. at 630.
264. 133 A.D. 207, 117 N.Y.S. 211 (2d Dep't 1909).
265. Id. at 210, 117 N.Y.S. at 213-14.
266. 77 Hun 380, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1894).
267. Id. at 384, 28 N.Y.S. at 851.
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scionability, the court granted a new trial, permitting mortgagor
to assert a defense based upon a perceived custom of accepting
late payments.26 Thus, the true basis of the decision could, and
probably should have been waiver. Whether a waiver finding
here would meet present day standards is doubtful, 69 although
this is difficult to resolve since it is often an issue of fact on a
case by case basis. Absent a waiver finding, however, it certainly
would not survive a Graf ruling.
Subsequent to 1930, the cases should be clearer, and most
rulings do adopt the strict approach for failure to pay principal
and interest.270 Other than such default (and breach of the due-
on-sale clause) the equity defense is more liberally employed.
Many of the cases so doing, however, apply equity for other vari-
eties of default - and that is a key distinction. For example,
equity is discussed as a defense with reference to a deficiency
judgment, 17 substitution of a party,2 7 2 appointment of a re-
ceiver, 27 application of HUD Handbook guidelines,2 74 due-on-
sale clause,2 7 5 taxes,276 tax receipts and estoppel certificate, 277
overturning foreclosure sale, 278 legal fees,2 7 9 removal of person-
alty,28 0 pleadings,281 building violations with respect to lack of
268. Id. at 387-89, 28 N.Y.S. at 853-54.
269. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
271. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Wood, 164 Misc. 215, 298 N.Y.S. 427 (Sup. Ct.
Delaware County 1937).
272. T.J. Bettes Co. v. South Falls Corp., 28 A.D.2d 198, 284 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dep't
1967).
273. Fairmont Assocs. v. Fairmont Estates, 99 A.D.2d 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d
Dep't 1984).
274. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1975).
275. Newburgh Say. Bank v. Grossman, 118 Misc. 2d 1036, 462 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup.
Ct. Orange County 1982); See also Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426
(Dutchess County Ct. 1978).
276. Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 316 (1891).
277. Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1986).
278. Notey v. Darlen Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 1055, 364 N.E.2d 833, 396 N.Y.S.2d
169 (1977). See also Baldwin-Bellmore Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Stellato, 55 Misc. 2d
1043, 287 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968).
279. Lincoln First Bank v. Thayer, 102 Misc. 2d 451, 423 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1979). Although the issue was denial of a legal fee to a foreclosing
plaintiff, the decision is clearly against the weight of all authority on the subject.
280. Blomgren v. Tinton 763 Corp., 33 Misc. 2d 1057, 225 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1962).
281. Josephson v. Caral Real Estate Co., 200 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1960).
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/1
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
repair,"2' and waste.28
The contentious problem, or as suggested here, the error,
develops in one of the two mentioned ways. One of those is to
presume the fading effect of Graf in an area where it never was
of paramount importance. A prime example is Karas v. Wasser-
man.284 Although plaintiff claimed a default in payment, the
facts demonstrated that no such breach existed. The two de-
faults which were found included failure to present receipts for
taxes and insurance within thirty days of the time due and neg-
lect to submit an estoppel certificate. Defendant admitted these
defaults and presented credible excuses. As to taxes and insur-
ance, these were actually paid and receipts had never been fur-
nished during the previous five years of the mortgage's exis-
tence. Concerning the estoppel certificate, defendant may have
been under a mistaken impression of its nature, believing it to
be merely a notice of payment due - which had already been
made.
In denying foreclosure, the third department stated that
"[p]laintiffs mistakenly rely here on the continued vitality of the
majority holding in Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., . . . to the effect
that acceleration clauses in mortgages will be strictly enforced
irrespective of the circumstances and nature of the default. '2 85
Plaintiffs may have relied upon and urged the cited con-
struction of Graf, but it is clearly not what the court of appeals
said. In Karas, equity as a defense to bo th defaults2 86 and waiver
as to nonsubmission of tax and insurance receipts,287 would have
been consistent with case law. Attacking Graf as a means to
reach the desired equitable result was unnecessary and ill-
founded.
Continuing, the court in Karas observed that:
282. Rockaway Park Series Corp. v. Hollis Automatic Corp., 206 Misc. 955, 135
N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); See also Caspert v. Anderson Apartments,
Inc., 196 Misc. 555, 94 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
283. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Avalon Orchards, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 297, 505 N.Y.S.2d 216
(3d Dep't 1986).
284. 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1982).
285. Id. at 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
286. See supra notes 246-247 and accompanying text.
287. See generally supra note 203.
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[Ilt seems clear that the evolving subsequent [to Graf] case law
has largely adopted the reasoning of Chief Judge Cardozo's dis-
senting position in Graf ... that the equitable remedy of foreclo-
sure may be denied in the case of an inadvertent, inconsequential
default in order to prevent unconscionably overreaching conduct
by a mortgagee ... 28s
Significantly, none of the decisions cited by the third depart-
ment as evolving case law presents either a Graf fact pattern or
default in making a mortgage payment."' For example, its cita-
tion of 100 Eighth Ave. Corp. v. Morgenstern29 0 is askew, involv-
ing unusual facts and making no mention of a purported contest
with Graf principles. In that case, the mortgagor sent his check
with sufficient funds in the account, but inadvertently neglected
to sign the check. Mortgagee retained the check until expiration
of the grace period without telling mortgagor of the error. Accel-
eration and foreclosure ensued. Finding mortgagee's conduct un-
conscionable, with a minute default of $30.27 on a mortgage of
$80,000, relief was granted.291 With a mortgagee taking knowing
and obviously unfair advantage of an inadvertent error, the facts
are far enough removed from Graf so that this citation is ex-
posed as faint.
Another instance of an attack on Graf when principal and
interest were not involved is Karhan v. 1374 First Ave. Realty
Corp.292 There, the issue was a motion to vacate the ex parte
appointment of a receiver. In granting the motion, the court gra-
tuitously noted in dicta that in its opinion, the foreclosure would
not succeed and that refusal to accept a late payment was unjus-
tified and harsh2 3 - a postulation clearly in error.2 94
288. Karas, 91 A.D.2d at 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
289. For example, the citation to Blomgren v. Tinton 763 Corp., 33 Misc. 2d 1057,
225 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962), modified, 18 A.D.2d 979, 238 N.Y.S.2d
435 (1st Dep't 1963) was inapposite. It partly involved acceleration for removal of per-
sonalty from the property which was in any event replaced. The majority opinion did not
even cite Graf much less suggest its influence was on the wane. Similarly, reliance upon
More Realty Corp. v. Mootchnick, 232 A.D. 705, 247 N.Y.S. 712 (2d Dep't 1931) and
Scelza v. Ryba, 10 Misc. 2d 186, 169 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957), is
inappropriate since both are waiver cases and do not stand for a weakening of Graf.
290. 3 Misc. 2d 410, 150 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956), modified, 4
A.D.2d 754, 164 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1957).
291. Id. at 418, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
292. Index No. 10571/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Nov. 3, 1982).
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 58, 102 and accompanying text.
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The direct frontal assault on Graf when principal and inter-
est was the apparent issue is found in seven cases, from 1943
through 1984, five on the supreme court level and two in the
appellate division, the latter in the third and fourth
departments.295
The earliest of these is Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty
Co.2 96 There, a payment of principal and interest was due on
November 15 with a ten-day grace period to November 25. The
acceleration letter was sent on November 27, although the mort-
gagor claimed not to have received it until November 30. While
a payment of principal alone was forthcoming, it was not paid
until November 30 - after expiration of the grace period and
subsequent to mailing of the acceleration letter. A full monthly
installment of principal and interest was remitted on December
3.297 Foreclosure pleadings were served on December 3.
Relying upon the dissent in Graf v. Hope Building Corp.29 s
and the holding in Ferlazzo v. Riley, 99 the Domus court found
the default inadvertent and trivial, the mortgagor inexperienced
in real estate matters and confused as to the applicable grace
period, with no prejudice to the mortgagee.300 It therefore de-
clined to grant summary judgment to the mortgagee, choosing
295. DiMatteo v. North Tonawonda Auto Wash, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 692, 476 N.Y.S.2d
40 (4th Dep't 1984); Fairmont Assocs. v. Fairmont Estates, 99 A.D.2d 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d
208 (3d Dep't 1984); Miller v. Kotzen, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County); Scheible v. Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1971); Shapiro v. Housewares Super Mart, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 107, 250 N.Y.S.2d
343 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964); Battim Assocs. v. L & L Estates, 186 Misc. 141, 58
N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945); Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co., 179
Misc. 750, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 266 A.D. 725, 41 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1st Dep't 1943).
296. 179 Misc. 750, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943), afl'd, 266 A.D. 725,
41 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1943).
297. The court emphasized that the default, taking the grace period into account,
was five days for principal and eight days for interest. But immediate default was sanc-
tioned by the court of appeals in Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884
(1930), with acceleration only three days after default likewise approved in Albertina
Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472, 180 N.E. 176 (1932). The court also
neglected to observe the ruling in Bolmer Bros. v. Bolmer Constr. Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 530
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952), that a tender is good only when received, not when
mailed.
298. 254 N.Y. 1, 7, 171 N.E. 884, 886 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J., dissenting).
299. 278 N.Y. 289, 16 N.E.2d 286 (1938).
300. Domus Realty Corp., 179 Misc. at 754, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
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instead a hearing on the mortgagor's understanding of the grace
period and other claims about correspondence. The court specif-
ically considered Graf but, in view of the dissent, found the
mortgagee's conduct to be so harsh and unconscionable as to be
of a level to fall outside of the Graf holding. It is hard to glean,
however, how the facts materially differed from Graf, with the
possible sole exception of mortgagor's claim as to nonreceipt of
the acceleration letter. It may have been that the minutiae of
the fact pattern would have been sufficient to deny summary
judgment, although that is quite doubtful. What is clear is that
even a sympathetic, inadvertent default is not enough to invoke
equity when principal and interest have not been paid.3 °1
Battim Assoc. v. L & L Estates °2 is a terse, curious and
misplaced analysis of the role of the Graf principles. Payment
was due on August 1, but not mailed due to an error by mortga-
gor's accountant. When the error was discovered on August 31,
the installment was mailed, together with the payment due on
September 1. No acceleration letter was sent. Manifestation of
acceleration occurred by filing a foreclosure pleading with the
county clerk on September 10.303
Neither the tardy check submitted on August 31 nor the
September payment remitted simultaneously were returned.
Since acceleration by filing the pleadings came after a valid
tender curing the default, that should have been the basis to re-
ject foreclosure, although such was not stated. Moreover, even if
acceleration had come before tender, retaining the checks could
have been a waiver of acceleration. 04 Neither was that principle
cited. Rather, the court acknowledged that Graf v. Hope Bldg.
Corp."5 was "still the law [but] it seems to be the effort of the
courts to escape its effect wherever the facts will permit. '306
301. Id.
302. 186 Misc. 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945).
303. Id. at 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 96-97. Pursuant to Albertina Realty Co., 258 N.Y. at
476, 180 N.E. at 177, filing the pleadings with the county clerk is a valid election to
accelerate. See also supra note 40.
304. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 54-84 and
accompanying text.
305. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
306. Battim Assocs., 186 Misc. 141, 58 N.Y.S.2d 96. The court cited Domus Realty
Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co., 179 Misc. 749, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd,
266 A.D. 725, 41 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1943), as authority for this proposition. But if
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Such may indeed be the position of the courts - and some-
times is when a default other than principal and interest (and
due-on-sale) is concerned. It may also be, as this court noted,
"wherever the facts will permit." But these were not such facts
nor, significantly, the facts which gave rise to Graf. While Bat-
tim can reinforce the usual waiver concepts, or the maxim that
tender of arrears prior to acceleration must be accepted, Battim
does not vitiate the Graf formulation.
Clearly at variance with Graf is the decision at special term
in Shapiro v. Housewares Super Mart0 7 which, as did the court
in Battim, relied upon Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co.,
Inc.308 as precedent. A check for the June installment was pre-
pared and signed prior to its due date. It was placed in an envel-
ope for mailing but was mislaid. Since mortgagor's checkbook
showed the payment as made, the mortgagor was unaware of the
actual default - a sympathetic situation no doubt, but no more
so than the events in Graf and indeed, strikingly similar in
essence.
309
Immediately upon expiration of the grace period, mortgagee
accelerated. One month and eight days after default, mortgagor
attempted to cure. Adding a new wrinkle that "rights are deter-
mined on the facts as they exist at the time of the decree and
not at the inception of the suit, '310 the court found mortgagee's
conduct unjustly burdensome, harsh and merciless in the face of
an unblemished history of timely payment. Although arguably
characterized as harsh, it is still the nature of default upon
which Graf would grant the remedy of acceleration. 11
Previously reviewed, on the subject of waiver, is the decision
Domus Realty Corp. incorrectly supports the statement, as this article suggests (see
supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text), the efficacy of Battim Assocs. is all the
more transparent.
307. 43 Misc. 2d 107, 250 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
308. 179 Misc. 750, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943), aff'd, 266 A.D. 725,
41 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1943).
309. Shapiro, 43 Misc. 2d at 108, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
310. Id. at 109, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 344 (citing Blomgren v. Tinton 763 Corp., 18 A.D.2d
979, 238 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dep't 1963)); Baker v. Salzenstein, 314 Il1. 226, 145 N.E. 355
(1924); Kosmerl v. Sevin, 295 Ill. App. 345, 15 N.E.2d 20 (1938).
311. To adopt the view that rights are to be determined at the time of the decree
would render Graf absolutely meaningless since courts could always examine what hap-
pened after acceleration, evaluate each situation based on that, and reject acceleration
for payment defaults with virtual impunity.
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in Scheible v. Leinen.32 This is a conspicuously anomalous rul-
ing because it denied the efficacy of acceleration while purport-
ing to specifically confirm Graf. The court here simply did not
wish to countenance foreclosure - at least not without a trial.
The facts follow. When mortgagor submitted payments for April
and May, he failed to realize they were actually for March and
April. When a grace period expired on June 1, mortgagee re-
sponded by accelerating on June 3.313 With a quick acceleration,
no prior notice of default and a low interest mortgage - none
of which bear on the effect of Graf - the court found the possi-
bility of bad faith and unconscionable conduct. 14 Still further,
the court determined that acceptance of one prior late payment
could give rise to waiver.3 1 While that too is against the weight
of case law,3 16 questions of fact are always difficult to assess from
afar. In any event, this is another lower court decision which
cannot be seen as effectively challenging Graf.
Another supreme court rejection of Graf on some unusual
and extremely sympathetic facts is found in Miller v. Kotzen.5 17
The mortgage documents were unclear as to precisely when
mortgage payments were due. Nevertheless, the court construed
conduct of the parties as establishing the fifteenth of the month
as the due date. With a fifteen-day grace period, there could
thus be no default until the thirtieth day of the month.
Mortgagor embarked upon timely payments, but then mort-
gagee went to Florida for the winter, although duly notifying
mortgagor of the new address to which payments were to be
mailed. The December installment, which should have been
mailed to Florida, was posted to mortgagee's New York address.
It was, nevertheless, forwarded and received, from which event
the court concluded a waiver arose as to mailing destination. 18
Mortgagor testified that he prepared the January check on
January 14. He did not recall what address he placed on the en-
velope and conceded that he did not personally mail it. It never
312. 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971).
313. Id. at 458, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
314. Id. at 459, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
315. Id.
316. See supra notes 202-236 and accompanying text.
317. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County).
318. Id.
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arrived. Consequently, the mortgagee accelerated by letter dated
February 4 - after expiration of the grace period. On February
8 a replacement check was sent. The replacement check and all
subsequent checks were dutifully rejected by mortgagee. 19
The court reviewed Graf at length, as well as a series of
cases denying foreclosure,3 20 and chose to disallow the foreclo-
sure. It found that mortgagor's payment history was such that
mortgagee should have known that mortgagor was reliable and
creditworthy. Mortgagee should have further recognized, the
court said, that the January installment was mortgagee's for the
asking and should have realized something was amiss when not
timely received. Failure to make inquiry followed by "immedi-
ate" acceleration was found to be a lack of good faith with the
acceleration held "unconscionable and oppressive under the
circumstances. "321
There being no valid support in case law for the court's
findings here, perhaps more significant was the determination
that equity is available to provide relief from default arising
from a loss in the mails. Such a holding, however, is unfortunate
for two reasons. First, the citation in support is Nove Holding
Corp. v. Schechter12 a pre-Graf decision of questionable appli-
cation at best. Second, a "lost in the mails" defense creates
enormous practical problems since it is a facile defense, easily
available without proof. Assuming a court is persuaded that an
installment was mailed - although it was less than clear in this
case - it may be that a loss in the mails is a third party error
not to be considered as falling within the proscription of Graf.
To the extent this case stands for such proposition, it may be a
refinement of Graf, albeit untested by a higher court. However,
319. Id.
320. Conspicuous among the cases cited were Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812,
458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1986), which did not entail a default for principal and inter-
est, 100 Eighth Ave. Corp. v. Morgenstern, 3 Misc. 2d 410, 150 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1956), which did not encompass a Graf fact pattern, Domus Realty Corp.
v. 3440 Realty Co., 179 Misc. 750, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 266 A.D.
725, 41 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1943), a dubious attack on Graf at best, and Blomgren v.
Tinton 763 Corp., 33 Misc. 2d 1057, 225 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1949),
which dealt with removal of personalty.
321. Miller, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2.
322. 218 A.D. 479, 218 N.Y.S. 623 (1st Dep't 1926). Also cited was Console v.
Torchinsky, 97 Conn. 353, 116 A. 613 (1922).
1988]
55
PACE LAW REVIEW
if it attempts to alter Graf with a sympathy approach, it appears
to be incorrect and unsound as precedent.
The penultimate reported case purporting to erode Graf is
the first at the appellate division level, Fairmont Assoc. v. Fair-
mont Estates.238 While revolving around a claimed failure to
make a payment, the circumstances are so dissimilar to Graf as
to be a unique situation. Most critical here is that the mortgage
contained a rarely encountered clause requiring mortgagee to
give five days notice of default as a prerequisite to accelera-
tion. 24 The events surrounding the default and the notice
thereof create singular circumstances.
The convoluted facts are as follows. On March 31, mortga-
gor posted the check for the April installment. When the check
was not received by April 4, mortgagee on that date mailed its
notice of default. On April 6 the check was received and depos-
ited. Mortgagee learned on April 13 that the check it deposited
was to be returned for insufficient funds.3 25 The source of what
at that time ripened into a breach could not be clearly identified
as an inadvertent error on the part of the mortgagor or its bank.
On that same date of April 13, mortgagee wrote to mortga-
gor to advise of the default - apparent because of the lack of
funds - as well as an intention to accelerate.3s2 Another cloudy
issue develops here because the clarity of the acceleration is not
known. 27 On April 15 the letter was received by mortgagor
which was the first time mortgagor learned that its check was
insufficient. Mortgagor immediately offered to replace the check
and on April 18 it actually remitted the sum due. It was only on
that day that the April 13 correspondence purporting to acceler-
ate was received.3 28
Because mortgagee refused to accept the replacement check
and waive the default, mortgagor instituted an action to declare
the mortgage in good standing. Mortgagee counterclaimed for
foreclosure and sought appointment of a receiver. Special term
323. 99 A.D.2d 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1984).
324. Id. at 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Recall that an acceleration must be clear and unequivocal and is ineffective if
threatening acceleration in futuro. See supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
328. Fairmont Assocs., 99 A.D.2d at 895, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
[Vol. 8:475
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/1
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
dismissed the counterclaims and the third department
affirmed.329
An unresolved issue is whether mortgagee ever gave the no-
tice of default required by the mortgage. Was that notice effec-
tive when the check was received or could it have been valid
only five days after notification that the check bounced? It is
perhaps an open question. The confluence of that conundrum,
the unusual facts and the question of the authenticity of the ac-
celeration, make it difficult to quarrel with the decision even if
one were inclined to do so. But this was not a Graf situation. It
is unfortunate that the ruling, which appears otherwise to be the
correct result, takes issue with the efficacy of Graf. In addition,
it again cites Karas v. Wasserman3 ' as further support for the
position, a case which inappropriately contests Graf since it does
not address a principal and interest default.
The final and most recent instances of Graf beseiged is
found in DiMatteo v. North Tonawanda Auto Wash, Inc., 31
which presents a misconstrued analysis. Payments were due on
the first of the month with a seven-day grace period. The March
payment was made by a check dated and delivered on March 2.
It was deposited by the mortgagee on March 30, in the same
bank on which the check was drawn. On the next day it was
returned for insufficient funds. Mortgagor apparently attempted
a number of times to tender the arrears but each time it was
refused by mortgagee. Acceleration was accomplished on Octo-
ber 7 by filing the pleadings with the county clerk. 3 '
Mortgagor offered proof that had the check been presented
for payment any day up to March 15, or redeposited on March
31, it would have been honored. Hence, there is no Graf situa-
tion here since part of the fault at least reposed with mortgagee.
The court noted the default as the result of inadvertent
mistake, mentioning mortgagor's claim that it was merely an er-
ror in balancing its checking account. This, the court found,
raised factual issues sufficient to prevent foreclosure and deny
329. Id.
330. 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1982). For a discussion of Karas, see
supra text accompanying notes 250-253.
331. 101 A.D.2d 692, 476 N.Y.S.2d 40 (4th Dep't 1984).
332. Id. at 692, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
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summary judgment s3 Precisely which factual issues could viti-
ate Graf were unstated.
In any event, this case should not stand as a decision weak-
ening Graf. Tender was attempted at various times subsequent
to default but prior to acceleration in October. Tender before
acceleration is a complete defense,3" and that alone could have
disposed of the case. Nevertheless, the court chose to rely upon
unconscionability as a defense. It analyzed Graf, observed un-
conscionability as an exception and analogized the instant facts
to a case where acceleration in a lease had been voided by the
court of appeals.33 5
VIII. Conclusion
When the court of appeals pronounced its doctrine in Graf
v. Hope Bldg. Corp.,,"' it created an exigent precedent which
gave great stability to the subject of mortgage foreclosure and,
not incidentally, extensive comfort to any holder of a mortgage.
Obviously, the basic obligation of a mortgage is for payments to
be made. There are, of course, additional covenants, some more
important than others, some of greater or lesser moment de-
pending upon the peculiar circumstances of each case - factors
which can vary so diversely as not to be susceptible to perma-
nent unwavering rules.
Graf may be viewed then as having two applications, one
general, one specific. In a broad sense, Graf stands for the pro-
position that the mortgage contract is inviolable, subject to ex-
ceptions, stated as waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud or oppres-
sive conduct, all circumscribed by considerations of equity.
Specifically, where the default is failure to remit a payment
due, relief cannot be granted to the mortgagor merely because
his error was inadvertent or minor and even though the end re-
sult is perceived as harsh.
Returning to the general proposition, where the breach is
333. Id. at 693, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
334. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 54-84
and accompanying text.
335. DiMatteo, 101 A.D.2d at 693, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (citing Fifty States Manage-
ment Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parts, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 389 N.E.2d 113, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800
(1979)).
336. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
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neither of the obligation to pay or violation of the due-on-sale
clause (especially with the federal override imposed by Garn-St
Germain) the courts retain what is apparently broad latitude to
examine the exceptions and weigh the role of equity. Mortgagees
will still insist upon strict construction of the mortgage contract
and point to Graf in support of their position. Breaches are not
to be taken lightly and foreclosure is indeed authorized and
granted for a wide range of defaults. But in this realm, the fac-
tual situations will be of paramount importance. Based in part
upon Chief Judge Cardozo's exceptionally persuasive dissent in
Graf, the subsequent decisions based thereupon and the tenets
of equity, the courts can and will assess the circumstances to
arrive at a conclusion ultimately deemed fair. What precisely the
result will be must be dependent upon the facts and therefore
remains somewhat elusive.
Addressing again the more specific instances of failure to
pay, Graf survives as potent as it has always been. Faced with
the basic facts encountered in Graf, an acknowledged failure to
pay, even under sympathetic circumstances, and absent waiver,
estoppel or fraud - it being virtually impossible to qualify bad
faith - there is no room for courts to fashion a perceived equi-
table remedy.
If a mortgagor innocently neglects a payment, the breach
strikes so deeply to the heart of the sacred mortgage contract
that courts are bound to enforce that agreement as written. The
noted exceptions still exist, but critically it is not bad faith, nor
oppressive or unconscionable for the mortgagee to insist strictly
upon enforcing its right to immediately declare due the entire
balance of principal and interest - that is, to accelerate. Nor
can equity circumvent the impact of Graf where the failure is in
payment.
The obvious discord and discomfort engendered by cases
otherwise bound to follow the mandate of Graf has created a
degree of backlash. But in the zeal of some courts to assuage the
harsh result, they have conjured up a straw man on some occa-
sions and attacked Graf when it was not necessary to do so. If
payment, for example, was made, or validly attempted prior to
acceleration, reference to Graf has no basis. Similarly, if acceler-
ation has been waived, Graf has no application. For some courts
then to assert the waning influence of Graf is both incorrect and
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misleading. Furthermore, it creates an erroneous ground swell of
dicta and purported precedent tending to undermine an area
which requires stability.
The chagrin of some courts notwithstanding, until the court
of appeals specifically addresses Graf anew - with regard to
defaults for principal and interest - the doctrine, although
sometimes criticized, has not been persuasively or effectively
limited or changed.
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/1
